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ABSTRACT
This dissertation examines the influence of internal and external actors in
pressuring Kenya to embrace liberalization during the Moi presidency. It argues that
internal actors had more influence than external actors such as the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) in forcing the Moi government to concede to
liberalization. To make its argument, the dissertation analyzes the influence of Kenya‘s
colonial history, Harambee (self-help groups), the economic decline of the 1970s and
1980s, ethnic rivalry, and the role of Moi‘s repressive regime in bringing about
liberalization. It uses Kenya‘s agricultural and financial sectors as case studies to explain
how the influence of these actors/factors contributed to liberalization. The dissertation
concludes by emphasizing why it is important to seriously consider the role of internal
actors when examining liberalization (or any other reform policies). One reason is that
the ―on-the-ground‖ actors are primary in determining whether or not a policy can even
be implemented, let alone succeed. In that respect, the dissertation recommends that
international financial institutions consult with all domestic actors, including political and
social activists, as part of their engagement with governments on any reform initiative.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION, REVIEW OF LITERATURE, METHODOLOGY,
STRUCUTURE OF THE DISSERTATION

Why did Kenya embrace political and economic liberalization during the
period of its second postcolonial president, Daniel arap Moi (1978-2002)? What
factors in the colonial and postcolonial history of Kenya played into the decision to
embrace liberalization? To what extent did external actors such as the World Bank
and International Monetary Fund (IMF) play a part in pressuring the Moi
government to embrace the policies and practices of liberalization?

These questions are an attempt to engage in the broad discussion in the
literature on policy diffusion and policy implementation. From the 1980s to the
present, this discussion has centered on whether internal or external actors have more
influence in forcing states to embrace the policies and practices of liberalization. In
the case of Kenya during the Moi government, this dissertation argues that internal
actors and factors were the primary drivers that forced President Moi to concede to
liberalization while the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and
donor countries played a secondary role. In other words, the real drivers of Kenya‘s
journey toward economic reform were internal actors simply fed up with the way
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things were and wanting change in the form of political openness and economic
opportunity.

Three factors helped galvanize the efforts of the internal actors. The first
factor was the economic decline that Kenya experienced under the Daniel arap Moi
government. The second factor was President Moi‘s effort to restrict opposition to
his government by repression and amending Kenya‘s Constitution to make it a oneparty system. The third factor was the intense ethnic rivalry between the Kalenjin
tribe and the Kikuyu tribe, the Kalenjin represented by President Moi and the Kikuyu
represented by his predecessor, President Jomo Kenyatta. This rivalry was
manifested in President Moi‘s use of public policy to marginalize the Kikuyu
political and business elites, whose resentment helped fuel the reform movement.

The path to liberalization in Kenya, however, presents to scholars and
observers of Kenyan politics a number of interesting challenges because of the
country‘s idiosyncrasies. To most scholars, the path to liberalization starts at
economic crises that lead countries directly to the doors of western donors—be they
international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) or countries—that have money to loan if the recipient
countries follow their rules. While Kenya began the path to liberalization in the usual
way – economic crises and trips to the donor institutions for financial aid– it did not
follow the rules of the external actors. The donor institutions assisted the process
2

through loans and technical assistance, but they often walked away in frustration by
the government‘s constant reneging on conditionality terms and unwillingness to
implement their policy recommendations. There are lessons to be learned from an
examination of Kenya‘s unique journey toward liberalization, which was often
fractious, but ultimately a largely successful journey.

1.1

Review of the Literature

This dissertation‘s argument that internal actors and factors were more
influential in driving Kenya toward liberalization than were external actors runs
counter to the dominant views in the literature. The dominant views on the diffusion
of liberalization throughout the developing world largely converge on a consensus
that the primary drivers of liberalization in the 1980s and 1990s were external actors
and that internal actors were secondary, or merely served as receptacles of ideas
from the international actors. The advocates of the external-actors-as-the-drivers of
liberalization posit that reform policies were designed in Washington, D.C. and other
capitals of the developed world and imposed on Africa. African countries could not
refuse the externally imposed reform policies because their acceptance was a
condition for receiving financial assistance, assistance they desperately needed
(Bond 2001; Danaher 2001; Rono 2002).
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Maclean (1997) argues that liberalization was a Western-dominated model
imposed on African states by international financial institutions. For Maclean, the
liberalization agenda, which included reducing the size of government, privatization
of state-owned enterprises, and good governance, sounded exactly the same as the
debates of the 1960s and 1970s when the West was pushing various forms of
development models. She sees the discourse around liberalization in the context of
unequal north-south relations; thus, in the case of Sub-Saharan Africa, one cannot
divorce how African states have been ―influenced by the diffusion of ideologies from
outside [and that] their marginal position in the global economy […] has reduced
their ability to resist the pressures of dominant international financial actors‖
(Maclean 1997:138).

By the early 2000s, the voices of many of those excoriating western-based
institutions for leading the march of liberalism became more amplified. Amin (2004)
compares liberalism to a ―virus‖ born in the west and spread to other countries and
cultures by the West. Woods (2006) notes that the IMF and the World Bank have
forced many countries to open their economies to international trade, investment, and
capital flows. Such pressure to force developing countries to adopt liberalizing
reforms comes in ―various ways, from the subtle to the overt: through the threat or
use of physical force, the manipulation of economic costs and benefits, and even
through the monopolization of information and expertise‖ (Simmons, Dobbin, and
Garrett 2006:10).
4

Liberalization through policy conditionality requires that a member country
must agree to adopt a given set of policies in return for financial assistance from the
World Bank and/or the IMF. In this sense, conditionality is to be understood as the
promise of financial assistance to countries by these external actors if the countries
agree to embrace liberalization. Fearon (1988) calls conditionality ―coercion‖
because in the 1980s countries sought financial assistance from the IMF and/or the
World Bank during economic crises and therefore had no bargaining leverage. Other
scholars use similar lines of argument as Fearon by saying that the developing
countries lacked leverage to negotiate with the donor institutions because they were
forced to decide whether to accept the conditions under economic, political, and
social stress caused by the crises they were facing at the time. Clearly unwilling to
let their economies collapse, they accepted the demands or conditions the institutions
imposed (Harrison 2005; Stallings 1992). According to Mosley, one of the earliest
scholars to argue that international donors have been the drivers of liberalizing
reforms:

This pressure [to adopt liberalization] originally came in the form of
words, which asked above all for a lifting of controls on exchange
rates and agricultural prices. More recently, however, the pressure for
liberalization has come with teeth in the form of ‗policy
conditionality,‘ that is, of refusals by aid donors to disburse
development aid unless specific changes in economic policy are made
(Mosley 1986:107).

5

Those who argue that external forces are the drivers of liberalization often
cite market liberalization to create competition, which forces countries to become
more efficient and thus more competitive, an example of reform through
conditionality. This logic is based on the premise that there are limited markets for
goods and capital and that states that want access to such markets must adopt
policies that create incentives for domestic and international investors as well as
make their products competitive compared to other states. Such competitiveness is
achieved by adopting market-friendly policies preferred by the international
creditors. Again, this explanation of African governments‘ reform centered on
pressures from external forces as the countries faced the economic crises of the
1980s. As Rodrik posits:
[The 1980s was] a decade of great leverage for these institutions visa-vis debtor governments, especially where poorer African countries
are concerned. The trade policy recommendations of the World Bank
were adopted by cash-starved governments frequently with little
conviction of their ultimate benefits (Rodrik 1992:89).

The African countries were overly dependent on the donor institutions for
loans and credits, including debt cancellation, and thus were under pressure to follow
the external actors‘ policy recommendations. The countries were in need of
development financing which was critical for long-term investment in projects and
for overall development. They were also in need of credits and long-term lending
from commercial banks and having the approval of the IFIs made it easier for them
to receive credit. In short, the countries‘ urgent need for financial assistance,
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including relief from their debt burden, made them vulnerable to pressures from the
international creditors, which then caused them to reform and liberalize their trade
policies (Helleiner 1983). Kenya did face financial challenges as its economy was in
a downturn due in part to the oil shocks of the 1970s and sought financial assistance
from the World Bank and IMF.

Many of these explanations were made in the context of the fall of the Soviet
Union. The collapse of the Soviet bloc marked the triumph of liberalism and freed
the Western-based donor institutions from the constraints of East-West political
rivalry. The triumph of liberalism gave rise to an international march toward
economic and political reforms particularly in Central and Eastern Europe (Epstein
2008). When Africa joined this march in the early 1990s, it was an affirmation of the
notion that there was no alternative to liberalism (Eyoh 1996; Joseph 1992). Some of
the proponents of this view often point to legislation in the United States Congress as
an indication of external actors‘ pressure on developing countries to embrace
liberalization. For example, in 1990, Senator Edward Kennedy‘s aid legislation for
Kenya was ―explicitly tied to human rights improvement.‖ In early 1991, the United
States Agency for International Development (USAID) announced that it would
increase its direct assistance to countries that were adopting political and economic
liberalization (Mailafia 1997:31). There was no indication that these types of
legislation and announcements made any difference in Kenya.

7

While at some level the explanations that point to external pressure as the
driver of reform are useful and offer important insights about the influence of
external actors in liberalization in Africa, they are nonetheless limited. They cover
the impact of factors such as ―inappropriate‖ economic policies on the process of
liberalization but are limited in terms of explaining the process of liberalization that
emerged in response to internal circumstances involving tribal groups struggling to
take control of the state, the primary means by which access to political power and
economic resources is gained.

The explanation that emphasized conditionality and countries‘ desperation
for debt relief holds some merit. This argument did not hold for Kenya, however,
because Kenya was not among the IMF‘s Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC)
Initiative and, therefore, it was not eligible for debt cancellation at the time (Joseph
2002). The explanation that conditionality forced developing states to liberalize their
markets and compete for gains from international trade and investment also would be
difficult with respect to Kenya. Trade reform in Kenya (as in the developing world in
general) has always been met with skepticism on the part of both the public and
private sectors. Both sectors relied heavily on the state for different forms of
assistance and would be highly skeptical of such an imposition from the outside.

Observers sometimes ask why there has not been much comparison between
Sub-Saharan Africa, Central and Eastern Europe, and the former Soviet Union with
8

respect to the spread or the effects of liberalization. Swinnen et al. (2010) compared
the performance of liberalization in these regions and found major internal
differences. For example, they found that economic growth was initially stronger in
Africa than in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union because
Africa did not have a capital-intensive farming system prior to reform; therefore, it
did not suffer ―the decline in output and productivity that accompanied land reform
and privatization‖ that took place in these former communist states (432). Also,
liberalization improved price incentives in Africa while it worsened them in the
former communist states (Swinnen, Vandeplas, and Maerten 2010). The desire for
greater price incentives was one of the reasons that small-scale farmers and business
groups were agitating for reform in Kenya.

While it is reasonable and important to compare the performance of
liberalization in the different regions as a way to improve our knowledge, the same
cannot be done or applied to specific countries. The experience of Kenya differed
from countries in Central and Eastern Europe during the transition from communism
to democracy. Kenya never had a communist tradition and therefore their paths
toward liberalization cannot be compared.

Focusing on internal actors and highlighting the limitations of the
explanations that emphasize external actors as the drivers of liberalization is not to
argue that external actors had no influence. Rather, it is to argue that their influence
9

was secondary and that the interaction was very complicated. In some cases, their
interaction helped lead to liberalization and in other cases their interaction hampered
progress toward liberalization. For example, the announcement of the international
community to suspend quick-disbursement loans to the Kenyan government in 1991
may have been the final blow that pushed the government to consider multi-party
elections even as the Moi government was nearing collapse under the weight of
domestic popular pressure. When the IMF offered to help the government write
legislation, the internal actors refused and the process toward liberalization suffered
because the government pointed to such overt offer of assistance as external
meddling and sought to discredit the internal actors who were agitating for the
reforms. In both instances, however, the internal actors were primary and external
actors were secondary in the final decision.

The three factors – ethnic rivalry, economic decline, and political repression
and corruption – are interrelated and linked to Kenya‘s colonial history and legacy.
The country‘s colonial history and legacy created an environment in which domestic
actors had particular influences on policy changes, in this case political and
economic policy changes toward liberalization. The colonial legacy left an ethnic
divide that subsequent leaders easily exploited. Because of this historical context,
any movement toward political and economic reform could only take place in the
context of domestic politics.
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1.2

Definition of Terms

The concept of liberalization is the operational term in the study. While there
is no consensus on a specific definition of liberalization, there are some features that
are generally understood to define what it means to have a liberal political and
economic system. The main political features include the existence of more than one
political party with free and fair competition among them in periodic elections,
respect for the freedoms of expression and peaceful assembly, and respect for human
rights (Makinda 1996). Economic liberalization, on the other hand, involves
deregulation of financial and labor markets, privatization of state-owned enterprises,
elimination of marketing boards, and free trade policies and practices, which involve
reduction or elimination of agricultural subsidies to producers and consumers, and
removal of tariffs and other market-distorting barriers (Berman 1998).

These characterizations of political and economic liberalization align with the
Washington Consensus, often referred to as neo-liberalism, as clarified by John
Williamson in 1989. The terms ―reforms‖ or ―liberalizing reforms‖ used herein to
refer to any policy change that reduces government controls in the economy or
political system in favor of increasing the role of free market forces or giving the
individual more economic, political, and social rights and freedoms. When Kenya
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lifted controls on foreign exchange transactions and moved from a one-party system
to a multiparty system, for example, both were liberalizing reforms.

1.3

Case Selection

Among the former British colonies in East Africa, Kenya had the best chance
to succeed economically after independence and hence to spare its people much of
the poverty they endure today. Kenya had the best chance of success in part because
of the way in which its economy was structured compared to Uganda and Tanzania,
for example. Kenya had a settler economy based on both large- and small-scale
agriculture with a strong emphasis on private markets with a comparatively
sophisticated financial system. The country had an orderly handover from the
colonial authorities to the newly selected then elected Kenyan leaders.

In Uganda, the British helped develop a peasant economy led by a class of
feudal landlords and the country fell into political paralysis leading to a prolonged
civil war by 1971. Tanzania‘s system, first put in place by German settlers (18851916), emphasized small farmer coffee production (Samoff and Samoff 1976) and
persisted after the end of German rule but the British ―never managed to impose
successfully the constraints on smallholder production and marketing that were
imposed on Kenyan African coffee farmers‖ (Samoff and Samoff 1976:409).
12

Following independence, Tanzania adopted ujamaa (socialism) and Uganda
essentially collapsed.

Kenya, on the other hand, ―pursued a strategy that emphasized economic
growth over equity that built upon the institutions and policies inherited from the
colonial era.‖ It emphasized the importance of the private sector to the economy. It
―expanded production of [its] two principal export crops – coffee and tea – for which
Kenya enjoyed a comparative advantage in world markets and which could be grown
by small farmers; and receptivity to foreign private investment‖ (Barkan 1994:5).
Clearly the notion of liberalization was not foreign to Kenya in the 1980s and 1990s
and it remains puzzling to see many studies crediting external forces as the primary
drivers of liberalization in Kenya in these two decades.

The agricultural and financial sectors were selected as case studies for this
research because they have been closely linked in Kenya‘s history. The colonial
government heavily recruited foreign banks to help finance settler agriculture and the
Kenya-Uganda railway to ease transportation to increase trade in the late 1890s.
When the banks did not finance agriculture to the level that the colonial government
expected, the colonial government established the Land and Agriculture Bank to
finance settler agriculture. After independence, the Land and Agriculture Bank and
other financial institutions were transferred to the newly independent government,
putting state-owned banks in competition with private banks.
13

The two sectors have remained very important to Kenya‘s economy. Twenty
percent of Kenya‘s gross domestic product comes from the agricultural sector, and
more than 80 percent of the population live in rural areas and derive their
livelihoods, directly or indirectly, from agriculture. The financial sector is a key part
of the country‘s service sector, which contributes over 60 percent of Kenya‘s gross
domestic product.1 Lastly, it was small-scale farmers and business elites who called
for liberalization of markets and joined together to demand privatization and other
reforms in agricultural marketing boards and state-owned financial institutions and
other parastatals.

Ultimately, the dissertation seeks to illuminate policymakers and policymaking institutions to better understand the particular circumstances of Kenya and
how internal and external actors interacted either to produce or undermine expected
outcomes. The way the different actors and factors contributed to liberalization in
Kenya should be understood as modeled in Figure 1 below.

1United States Central Intelligence Agency. 2012. The World Factbook (Washington,

D.C.).<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ke.html>. Accessed
on April 13, 2012.
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Figure 1: Conceptual Overview of the Liberalizing Process in Kenya

Pre-liberalizing Stage
Political & Economic
Conditions
Historical
Context
 Colonialism
 Tribal
culture
 Political
Marginalization

 State-controlled
economy
 Colonial/
undemocratic
Liberalizing Stage:
governance
 Unjust policies/
inequality
 Lack of political
representation
 Political
Repression

Reform
Stimuli

Sources of Pressure
to Reform:
Internal

 Economic
decline
 Ethnic rivalry
 Corruption

 Tribal
factions/political
party rivalry
 Popular uprisings
(e.g., Mau Mau
Rebellion)
 Protests against
Moi government

External
 IMF
 World Bank
 Donor nations
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Reform Outcomes
 Market-driven
economy
 Individual
property rights
 Multiparty
political system
 Free/competitive
elections
 Rule of law

Historical Context serves to contextualize the factors that contribute to a
country‘s prospect of embracing political and economic liberalization, most notably
its history and culture and, in the case of Kenya, its postcolonial political and
economic development strategy. The culture of the tribal society, which emphasized
collective ownership of land, contextualizes the tension that later developed around
the establishment of private property laws and the rivalries among Kenya‘s tribal
communities and how these rivalries contributed to the extent to which Kenya
achieved liberalization.

The Pre-liberalizing Stage refers to economic and political conditions that
existed in both the colonial and post-colonial administrations through the first multiparty elections in 1992. To varying degrees, the colonial administration being the
most severe, governance was undemocratic during this period. Policies were unjust
and inequitable with respect to different ethnic groups and social classes. Favoritism
in political positions and levels of representation in the legislative council and
national parliament was manifest: in the colonial time by the settlers and under
Presidents Kenyatta and Moi by their respective ethnic groups. All three
administrations practiced political repression and policies that were anathema to
liberalization, including economic intervention.

16

The effect of these policies and practices was to create economic, political,
and social conditions that became untenable to the population and served as stimuli
for reform. These conditions, which became the underlying factors that helped
precipitate a reform movement, included tensions between settlers and indigenous
Kenyans and among different ethnic groups in Kenya. Even in the colonial period,
popular complaints against the colonial government led to the deadly Mau Mau
rebellion. Economically, Kenya suffered deep declines beginning in the mid-1970s
and lasting through the 1980s. The economic deterioration exacerbated the political
rivalry that existed primarily between the Kikuyu and Kalenjin tribal groups.
President Moi became increasingly authoritarian, causing intense political tension
between the government and government critics and potential political opposition.
Subsequent popular discontent led to public demonstrations against the Moi
government, placing him in the first wave of independence leaders in Africa ever to
face their populations in the streets.

The internal pressure against President Moi came primarily from the Kikuyu
and Luo ethnic communities, especially small-scale farmers, the business and
professional classes which he sought to marginalize through consolidation of
political power and advancing the interests of his Kalenjin tribal group and allies at
the expense of the other communities. A combination of economic hardship, political
repression, and tribal resentment led people to the streets to demand political and
economic reform.
17

The external pressure on the Moi government came from the IMF/World
Bank and donor countries as the economy deteriorated and internal actors agitated
for reform. The donors provided financial assistance and made policy
recommendations. For sure the IMF/World Bank had some influence by virtue of
their capability to provide financial assistance, but they were often frustrated by
Kenya‘s lack of progress in following their advice. The dissertation focuses on the
IMF/World Bank without singling out particular major donor countries because of
the closeness of the two donor institutions and the necessary approval that the
member countries must first give to loans and credits to countries.

The Liberalizing Stage refers to the point at which both the political and
economic systems began to open to competition. The Constitutional ban on
opposition parties was repealed, multiparty elections were held, and judicial tenure
restored. The government also reduced controls on foreign investors and
international trade and privatized state-owned banks and many other parastatals, all
indicators of liberalizing reform.
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1.4

Methodology

This is an historical narrative and interpretation of selected periods, actors,
policies, and events in Kenya‘s political and economic history with the goal of
explicating how these various actors and events led to Kenya becoming a more
liberalized economy during its first three decades of independence. Data collection
was done through desk and field research. Desk research involved examining journal
articles, books, reports, and newspapers obtained from libraries at the University of
Denver, Colorado State University, Howard University, and American University as
well as the IMF/World Bank Joint library in Washington, D.C. and from online
sources (web-based publications).

Field research was conducted in July and August 2010 in Kenya, including
visits to the national archives and the library at the University of Nairobi. Data were
gathered through interviews with three professors at the University of Nairobi; the
Director of the Tegemeo Institute at Egerton University; two representatives of the
Kenya Investment Authority; a business advisor for Fusion Capital, a fund that
finances small and medium-size private enterprises in East Africa; and a practicing
lawyer. In addition, interviews were conducted with a Program Officer at the
Institute of Economic Affairs and two representatives from two different non-profit
organizations, one with an international focus and the other with a Kenya focus.
19

The interviews were semi-structured with open-ended questions around the
nature of the debates within the government pertaining to adopting certain liberal
policies and the role of internal and external actors. Key informants were largely
selected through the process of snowball sampling, whereby ―the researcher accesses
informants through contact information that is provided by other informants‖ (Noy
2008:330). All of the interviews lasted from one to more than three hours.

In addition, informal interviews were conducted with a number of ordinary
professional people throughout Nairobi. These interviews were obtained by
approaching people leaving work at the end of the workday and asking them for a
few minutes. After explaining the project, several agreed ―to have coffee and talk.‖
Since the time of field research, follow-up conversations with one of the informants
have occurred over email.

Explaining the dominant role of domestic actors in forcing an authoritarian
state to concede to reform is not always easy for researchers. It was difficult in
Kenya particularly because the Moi government restricted popular opposition
politics. Because of legal restrictions on opposition politics, anti-government efforts
could not take organizational form. Opposition efforts had to be vague in their
programmatic content to avoid government censorship (Holmquist, Weaver, Ford
1994). In order to fully assess the influence of various factors in forcing reform in
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Kenya, one has to look at events and examine their contribution in the context of
Kenyan political and economic history and development.

Examining particular events for their contribution in terms of putting pressure
on the state requires a micro-level analysis. The resignation of an obscure minister,
for example, or the murder of an activist, or protests by mothers of political prisoners
at a specific street corner may not be considered important in a macro analysis of
factors that bring pressure on the state to reform. Seemingly minor events are not
likely to be captured by macro-level approaches and therefore tend to go unnoticed
in the international relations literature with regard to why countries have embraced
liberalization. In this context, while an observer from afar who uses a macro-analysis
―may easily conclude that international pressures are the key to reforms, quite an
opposite conclusion may be reached through a micro-analysis, or case study
approach‖ (Press 2005:14).

1.5

Structure of the Dissertation

The remainder of the dissertation is presented in five additional chapters.
Chapter Two provides a contextual overview of Kenya‘s political, economic, and
social history. The chapter examines the relations among the various ethnic and tribal
communities and the dominant role of these factors and actors in influencing
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liberalization in Kenya from the pre- and colonial period (1822-1963) through the
Jomo Kenyatta presidency (1963-1978).

The chapter highlights the role and influence of customary traditions in
promoting or discouraging the notion of private property rights, a key feature of
liberalization and how pre-independence, tribal-affiliated associations served as the
catalyst for national political parties in postcolonial Kenya‘s liberalization
movement. Evolving from local politics to national politics, the parties nonetheless
remained tribal and parochial, a factor that remains at the center of current Kenyan
political and economic affairs and continues to foment intense rivalry among the
most politically active ethnic groups.

Chapter Three explores the period of Kenya‘s second president, Daniel arap
Moi, and explicates how economic decline, corruption, repression in Harambee, and
ethnic rivalry created the conditions that led domestic actors to mobilize popular
pressure against his government for political and economic reform. This chapter
illustrates the relatively limited role of external actors but how, through their
financial power, they served as a complement to the domestic reform pressures that
were being exerted on the government. It was this type of interaction (alliance) that
eventually forced President Moi to concede to reform.
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Chapters Four and Five narrow the focus of liberalizing reform in Kenya and
examine in detail the reform process in the agricultural and financial sectors,
respectively. In presenting the sector analyses, each chapter examines the relative
contributions of internal and external factors in bringing about sector reform.

Chapter Six concludes the dissertation with a summary discussion of the
relative contributions of domestic politics and external pressure as drivers of
liberalizing reform in Kenya and notes the value for funders and policy-makers in
considering on-the-ground political and cultural realities when crafting future reform
strategies.
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CHAPTER TWO
HISTORY AND PRESSURES FOR LIBERALIZATION

Glaring disparities in Kenya's land wealth began with British
colonialists, who forcibly removed thousands of families from lush
highlands so white farmers could grow coffee and tea. Rather than
unwind the disputes after winning independence, Kenya's founding
fathers compounded the injustices, helping themselves to the departing
colonialists' spoils and even continuing forced resettlement schemes.
Every Kenyan president has been accused of accumulating massive
land holdings, diverting public properties to his tribe members and
doling out real estate titles like candy to win votes. The family of Jomo
Kenyatta, Kenya's George Washington, sits on half a million acres,
while his successor, Daniel [a]rap Moi, holds more than 100,000 acres,
a government commission found. Current President Mwai Kibaki owns
about 30,000 acres, according to local reports (Sanders 2008).2

This chapter presents a historical overview and a review of the political and
economic actors and factors that shaped Kenya‘s liberalization process. One of the
most important domestic factors that this chapter highlights is the impact of
traditional customs on the development of policies regarding land tenure or private
property rights, a key feature of liberalization. Three distinct but interrelated periods
in Kenya‘s history have shaped the context of its liberalization trajectory: the precolonial period until independence in 1963 and the period of its first postindependence president, Jomo Kenyatta (1963-1978), and the period of the
2 Italics, mine.
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presidency of the Daniel arap Moi (1978-2002). The period of President Moi‘s
administration is covered in Chapter Three. This chapter discusses how strong
reactions among various internal actors against undemocratic policies and practices
during the first of those two periods led to popular pressure on the state, which then
had to reform. This historical overview and discussions of Kenya‘s different tribal
groups provide context for understanding why given ethnic groups may favor state
intervention in the economy at a particular time.

Kenya borders the East African nations of Ethiopia, Somalia, Tanzania,
Uganda and Sudan. With a total area of 580,367 square kilometers (197,000 square
miles), Kenya is roughly twice the size of the U.S. State of Nevada. Its population is
made up of many tribes whose members are farmers, agro-pastoralists, and
pastoralists. The farmers are concentrated in the fertile Rift Valley, west of Kenya‘s
capital city, Nairobi; the Central Province districts; and the coastal plains. The major
tribes engaging in farming are the Kikuyu, Luo, and Luhya. Agro-pastoralist tribes
are those that also raise livestock in addition to farming, including the Kalenjin who
live in the Rift Valley. The Maasai tribe is nomadic pastoralist and lives along the
arid and semi-arid regions of the north and northwest, parts of the lower Rift Valley,
and Central Province. The tribal makeup of Kenyan society has played an important
role in whether and how liberalization policies were implemented, a role that dates to
the colonial period (Knox 1998).
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Table 1 below, based on Kenya‘s most recent census, provides a sense of the
political districts and general concentration of the country‘s 11 largest tribes. Having
a sense of where the ethnic groups are concentrated is important for later discussions
of how Presidents Kenyatta and Moi prioritized different areas of the country with
regard to public policy. There are more than forty tribes in Kenya, only the 11 listed
below have populations greater than 250,000 members (Barkan 2011; Oparanya
2010).

Table 1: Kenya 2009 Census (Population: 38,610,097)
Tribe
Population
Kikuyu
6,622,576
Luhya
5,338,666
Kalenjin
4,967,328
Luo
4,044,440
Kamba
3,893,157
Kenyan Somali 2,385,572
Kisii
2,205,669
Mijikenda
1,960,574
Meru
1,658,108
Turkana
988,592
Maasai
841,622
Sources: (Barkan 2011:4-3)

Percent
17.2
13.8
12.9
10.5
10.1
6.2
5.7
5.1
4.3
2.6
2.2
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Political District
Central Province & Nairobi
Western Province
West Rift Valley Province
Nyanza Province
Eastern Province
North Eastern Province
Nyanza Province
Coast Province
Eastern Province
Northern Rift Valley
Rift Valley/Central Province

2.1

Pre-colonial Kenya

Before Britain‘s arrival in the region in 1822, Kenyan society was
decentralized and organized around clans and sub-clans. Political authority rested
primarily within councils of elders, and they exercised their authority in a
participatory and collegial way. Family units were also important in resolving a
number of societal matters. Family members would often be called upon to
participate in the governments in various capacities. Government decisions were
predictable, as they were made based on traditions and customs. ―The traditions and
customs collectively underscored the principle of impartiality‖ (Ludeki 2007:237).

This brief account of pre-colonial social relations and political structure is
not, of course, intended to suggest that pre-colonial Kenya was politically and
socially equitable even though some scholars argue that the decentralized nature of
some of Kenyan societies in the pre-colonial period made them egalitarian. They
pointed to communal ownership of land as an example of egalitarianism (Fortes and
Pritchard 1940; summarized in Ludeki [2007]). As Ludeki (2007) notes, land was the
property of the clan or family. Every male member of the clan was to be given a
piece of land once he reached adulthood. However, ―an individual land ‗owner‘
could not extend land rights to a stranger without the approval of the clan‖ (238). In
pastoral tribal communities, while individual family owned livestock, grazing fields
were collective properties and used by all (Ludeki 2007).
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A key feature of tribal life in pre-colonial Kenya was the community tradition
of Harambee. The term is defined as the ―collective and cooperative participation of
a community in an attempt to fill perceived needs through utilization of its own
resources‖(Ngau 1987:524). Traditionally, Harambee organizations were small selfformed groups that met to plan and work on projects to benefit either a household or
a community. Members worked in rotating fashion. They made decisions
collaboratively and through consensus. It was a basic, grassroots effort at community
development. Ngau (1987) noted that prior to the current individual- and marketinfluenced pattern of resource allocation and ownership, Harambee was a means for
communities to exchange labor and assistance and the efforts were oriented toward
addressing basic needs.

2.2

Colonial Kenya

The British first arrived in Kenya in 1822 when Seyyid Said, the Omani
Emperor, attacked Mombasa, Pate, and Pemba, which were ruled at that time by the
Mazui clan. To protect the clan, the Mazui appealed to the British for help, resulting
in British protectorate over Mombasa, Kenya‘s major port city. By the late 19th
Century, Britain had solidified its presence in the region and in 1895, Kenya became
a British Protectorate, allowing Britain to extend its territorial position from Asia to
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Africa. East Africa proved convenient for Britain because it linked with India
(Britain‘s largest colony) through the Indian Ocean (Wolff 1970). As the 19th
Century drew to a close, Britain‘s industrial power status faced increasing
competitive pressures from countries such as Germany, France, Belgium, and the
United States, so its territorial possessions became even more important sources of
food and raw materials. Britain moved swiftly to secure its territorial possessions
through the construction of a major railway to facilitate imports and exports.

In 1896, construction on the Kenya-Uganda railway, linking the interiors of
the two countries to the Indian Ocean at the port city Mombasa, was begun. By 1901,
the railway reached Kisumu, Kenya‘s third major city, on Lake Victoria and linked
Kenya and Uganda through the port city of Mombasa and the Indian Ocean. This
linking of these territorial possessions to increase trade was part of what Wolff
describes as ―fitting the new Protectorate into the imperial economy‖(1970:275).
Britain experienced noticeable increases in its imports as a result of these territorial
linkages. Between 1870 and 1913, Britain imported all raw cotton and a growing
share of the raw wool that it needed. Wheat and cheese imports had increased 81
percent; fruit had increased 64 percent; and meat had gone up 42 percent. Among
food imports, the share from imperial sources increased from 19.8 percent in 1870 to
30.3 percent in 1913; and raw materials from territorial possessions consistently
provided at least one-third of Britain‘s need during this period (Ndege 1992; Wolff
1970).
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Notwithstanding all the imports and exports made possible by the railway, it
was an expensive project to build and maintain. Colonial authorities sought to make
the railroad a self-financed operation by making the countries agriculturally
productive enough to support both domestic and international markets. Thus
constructing and maintaining the railway were inextricably linked to Kenya‘s
agricultural sector, its primary source of revenue. In order to meet the financial
objectives, the agricultural sector had to be developed and modernized.

To raise revenue to help build the railway, Britain turned to encouraging and
recruiting settlers into Kenya. As increasing number of settlers arrived in Kenya in
the early 20th Century, the country‘s best lands were given to them in individual
freehold under Crown Lands Ordinance of 1915. The Ordinance turned over all the
territory of the Protectorate to the Commissioner of Kenya (the East African
Protectorate) and later to the Governor. Soon thereafter, the colonial authorities
introduced various English property laws to supersede customary laws and make
legal individual property rights. Africans living in the productive lands in the Rift
Valley and other provinces were relocated by the colonial authorities to poor-quality
land areas created and labeled ―Native Reserves‖ by the colonial administrators and
administered by a Native Land Trust Board (Odhiambo and Nyangito 2002; Knox
1998).
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This process of moving native Africans into these newly created native
reserves resulted in massive landlessness, land fragmentation, overstocking and
degradation, as well as ―the disintegration of social and cultural institutions in the
reserves‖ (Odhiambo and Nyangito 2002:8). The process created landlessness
because the areas could not accommodate all of the people; it created land
fragmentation as people sought to carve out small pieces of land to live on. The
process caused overstocking and degradation as grazing areas became limited,
causing the land to be overused since the practice of rotation could not be applied. In
addition, the concept of individual freehold (or individualized land rights) created a
dual land tenure system. The Native Reserves were under a customary land tenure
system and subject to a variety of ―statutory restrictions, including prohibition from
cultivating cash crops,‖ while the confiscated lands given to the settlers operated
under a statutory individual freehold system, where individual owners made their
own decisions (Knox 1998:175).

The individual freehold system was said to be superior to the customary
system for many reasons among them that the freehold system would create a land
market that settlers could use to help finance their agricultural production. It was
argued that less efficient farmers would eventually sell their land to more efficient
farmers who in turn would increase the productivity of the land. For the colonial
government, the individualized land tenure system would increase Kenya‘s
agriculture production, especially cash crops for export, which would result in
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increased revenue for the state revenue needed to help finance the railroad. The
colonial authorities also assumed that those without land would become agricultural
laborers or urban workers. Statutory restrictions on the native reserves and on
Africans living outside the native reserves, combined with deprived economic
conditions resulting from being stripped of their land, political, economic, and social
rights, created among the indigenous Africans an atmosphere of resentment against
the settlers (Knox 1998; Odhiambo and Nyangito 2002; Spencer 1981).

The small number of the settlers in Kenya necessitated extensive reliance on
Africans for labor. The settlers put in place a complex system of institutions and laws
that forced African males between the ages of 15 and 40 to seek work on Europeanowned plantations. The laws included a tax code, a ban on African agricultural
production, and a registration and identification requirement. The tax system placed
a heavy burden on African males, especially the legal mandate requiring them to pay
annual taxes. In an impoverished country such as Kenya, one of the easiest ways, or
in some cases the only way, to earn the money to pay taxes to the government was to
work as a laborer on the European-owned plantations. A number of restrictions were
placed on Kenyan farmers, too. Kenyans were prohibited from growing the most
lucrative crops, including Arabica coffee. They were also disadvantaged by
significant differential freight rates of agricultural products vis-à-vis those in the
settler community. The registration system helped the colonial administrators to
manage, evaluate and control the labor force (Wolff 1970).
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As the colonial administrators barred political participation by indigenous
groups and imposed various economic and political restrictions, many political and
social organizations emerged to contest the restrictions and support their tribal
communities. Among these early indigenous groups were the Kenya African Union
(KAU) and the East African Association (EAA), which was forced by the colonial
government to shut down. As the Colonial Government continued its efforts to clamp
down on political activities by socio-political groups, the colonial authorities
declared a state of emergency, at which time KAU was banned and many of its
leaders arrested. The declaration of the state of emergency was in response to a
rebellion against the colonial government by nationalist Kenyans in 1953, the
uprising known as the Mau Mau rebellion (Kanyinga 1998)

2.3

Mau Mau Rebellion

Reforms began to happen when popular opposition rose against state policies
codifying land confiscation and discrimination against Africans, including farmers.
Mau Mau was a liberalizing movement because at its core were key liberal demands:
return of or fair compensation for land that was unjustly confiscated, land tenure
(property) rights equal to the settlers, equal rights to cultivate cash crops and equal
access to markets, and equal political representation in the colonial government.
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In response to the rebellion, the colonial government lifted statutory
restrictions in the native reserves and initiated statutory land tenure reforms,
allowing individual land titles and rights, as was the case for the settlers. The reforms
were codified in the 1954 Swynnerton Plan to Intensify African Agriculture. The
Plan had three phases: adjudication, consolidation, and registration. The adjudication
phase involved elevating individual ownership rights. The consolidation phase was
designed to merge small and unviable land units into more economically viable ones
to facilitate Africans to participate in the market economy. The registration phase
was to ensure a registry where land titles would be registered under individuals‘
names. All of these phases, it was believed, would ultimately reduce disputes over
land and create land markets. The Swynnerton Plan intended to allow small farmers
to grow cash crops, and the most fertile lands in the Highlands to be opened to more
indigenous farmers (Odhiambo and Nyangito 2002; Peterson 1986).

The colonial government had other interests for agreeing to such reforms.
The colonial government agreed to the reforms because it wanted to increase
agricultural production for export, as Britain was in great need of raw materials,
including agricultural products, after the Second World War. It also wanted to
forestall further political unrest that could damage the economy. According to Knox
(1998) and Ake (1996), the interests of the colonial government in agreeing to
liberalizing reform were not only to increase Kenya‘s agriculture production but also
34

to secure colonial political interests through the creation of an elite class of African
farmers, which would adhere to political moderation because of its interests in the
economy and as such it would be induced to more or less maintaining a market
economy.

The nationalist leaders complained that the Swynnerton Plan was not
sufficient and demanded more reform. In 1961, the colonial government introduced a
Million Acre Settlement Scheme (MASS) to extend the land tenure reform program
proposed under Swynnerton. MASS was developed to transfer 470,000 hectares of
land to 35,000 landless families, with an average size farm of about 12 hectares, at a
cost of about £30 million. The government also developed systems to provide
supporting services such as research and extension to farmers. While the nationalist
Mau Mau rejected the reforms as stipulated in the Swynnerton Plan, they embraced
and adopted the plan after independence (Ake 1988:123; Knox 1998).

The plan, however, would have presented many problems for the colonial
government, problems that the independence leaders had to address. Some of the
problems had to do with the stickiness of customary land tenure in Kenya‘s tribal
society. For example, what role would the traditional council of elders play in land
issues in a statutory individualized tenure system? How would the issue of nomadic
and pastoralist tribes be addressed with respect to land ownership when grazing
fields are traditionally communal properties? While the Swynnerton Plan set the
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framework for private property rights, contract farming, state and market support for
the intensification of African agriculture, it did not consider these types of questions
(Ochieng, 2006). Nonetheless, the Swynnerton Plan became the cornerstone of land
tenure reform in Kenya after independence, making Kenya a leading state in
adjudicating land titles and registration of land under individual names.

2.4

Emergence of Tribal Politics

A number of other community-based groups emerged during the Mau Mau
rebellion to help support the movement toward independence. Some of the groups
were religious orders, which, in addition to opposing the colonial government,
provided services to their ethnic communities. These emergent tribal groups had
different factions within them, the more radical of which wanted a complete
overthrow of the colonial political, social, and economic order, while others sought
different and more gradual approaches. As the members of these movements devised
strategies against the colonial state, the groups became the embryos for nationalist
political factions, which later became political parties. There were members in Mau
Mau who were less radical and saw the potential to be leaders in post-colonial
Kenya. Jomo Kenyatta, a member of the Kikuyu tribe, was the leader of this faction,
and an emerging Kikuyu capitalist class supported him. Some argue that this
capitalist class was seeking greater access to and support from the state to aggrandize
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and protect its interests, a position that it believed would allow it to compete with the
white settler community in post-independence Kenya. This capitalist class became
very powerful under Kenya‘s first post-independence President, Kenyatta, and the
dominant national political party, the Kenya African National Union3 (Kanyinga
1998).

These tribal-based associations became centers where political leaders and
activists in these tribes gathered to discuss strategies to effect political, economic,
and social change. They also served as the roots for eventual national political parties
and, as is the main function of political parties, they worked to express the collective
grievances and demands of the different groups against the colonial order, which
included the return of expropriated land, an end to political and economic
discrimination and access to education and other social necessities. The Mau Mau
rebellion, ―the best-organized expression of the demands of the colonized‖(Kanyinga
1998:45), caused the colonial state to seek greater control over socio-political
activities of these groups. One of the ways the colonial government sought to impose
greater control was to ban national political activities by the groups; the only
exception was groups sanctioned by the state.

Realizing that political, social, and economic change could not be stopped,
the colonial authorities began to signal their willingness to negotiate reform. One of

3Before independence, KANU was Kenya Independence Movement (KIM).
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the initial steps was the replacement of the 1922 Constitution with the Lyttelton
Constitution of 1954, which created a framework for better and increased inclusion
of Africans in the government and the general political life of Kenya. Even though
the activities of the African groups expanded considerably, numerous restrictions
remained, including the continuation of the ban on nationwide political activity by
socio-political groups. The new constitution led to the first-ever elections in 1957
that included Africans as candidates and voters for delegates to the Legislative
Council or LegCo (Kanyinga 1998).

Despite their success in promoting a new constitution and in bringing about
the inclusion of more Kenyans in the political process, the new African members of
LegCo remained politically weak. They were weakened by the fact that the colonial
administrators had banned national political activities and therefore African members
of the LegCo had no national political or economic platforms. The new leaders and
socio-political groups attempted to form a national alliance, but the state refused to
recognize the alliance and their effort failed. In addition to the difficulties
encountered from the state, divisions emerged among the leaders and their
corresponding groups on numerous fronts, including ethnicity, leadership rivalries,
personality, and ―infiltration by partisan white settler interests‖ (Kanyinga 1998:45).

The divisions among the members of the LegCo led to their separating into
two factions in late 1959, one supporting urban interests, the other rural interests.
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They would subsequently evolve into the two major political parties: the Kenya
Independence Movement (KIM) representing Kikuyu/Luo urban interests, and the
Kenya National Party (KNP) representing smaller and less influential ethnic rural
interests. The Kikuyu and Luo were closer to Nairobi, other urban areas as well as
more developed areas around the settler communities. The smaller ethnic groups
were marginalized in more remote and agricultural areas (Kanyinga 1998). This
division between the urban and rural constituencies had a number of implications.
The urban constituencies, by virtue of their proximity to the settler communities,
benefited from social programs, including education and health services. Barkan
(2011) notes that this inequality in access to services, over time, gave the Kikuyu
ethnic group an economic advantage over the other groups.

As preparations were underway for the first Lancaster House Conference in
1960,4 KIM and KNP agreed to put their differences aside to present a united front
and show Britain they were capable of governing their country. One of the first
positive outcomes of Lancaster was the lifting of the nationwide ban on political
activities by socio-political groups, resulting in the parties readying themselves to
engage in national campaigns in the new environment. After the Lancaster
Conference, the parties‘ long-established differences resurfaced. KIM organized its

The Lancaster House Conference was a set of three conferences that finally resulted in Kenya’s
independence in 1963. The first conference took place in 1960, which ended in a temporary
constitution. In the 1962 conference, the participants decided on a framework for an Africanled government. Finally, in the 1963 London conference, formal independence was granted
after arrangements around the issue of settler citizenship, rights, and other necessities were
agreed upon.
4
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supporters for a national conference in both March and May of 1960, which led to a
new name, the Kenya African National Union (KANU). Trying to placate other
smaller ethnic groups, the KANU leadership elected in absentia Daniel arap Moi
from the Kalenjin group and Ronald Ngala from the Coast for top positions in the
party (Gertzel, Goldschmidt, and Rothchild 1969).

Both Moi and Ngala rejected the offer from the KANU leadership. Moi
created his own political party, the Kalenjin Political Alliance, to reflect his ethnic
group interest, and Ngala formed the Coast African People‘s Union (CAPU) to
represent his. The Bukusu-Luhya ethnic group was represented by the Kenya African
People‘s Party (KAPP), which was formed by Muliro. Finally, Justus Ole Tipis
formed the Maasai United Front (MUF) to represent the Maasai tribe that lived
mostly in Southern Kenya along the Rift Valley (Gertzel et al. 1969). Unlike KANU,
which promoted a powerful central government, these smaller parties advocated for a
weak central government with stronger local and regional governments. The leaders
of the smaller parties believed that strong local governments would help them
counter a central government, which they knew would be headed by larger ethnic
groups.
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2.5

Postcolonial Kenya

The nearly seven decades of colonial rule that ended in 1963 shaped a society
and institutions that wholly favored the rights of the small settler segment of the
population and vastly undermined indigenous Africans‘ rights, including access to
resources and economic activity. Patron-client relations between the colonial state
and settlers in Kenya created agricultural and banking sectors that neglected peasant
and smallholder farmers in favor of settler land acquisition, farming, and banking
services. Through policies and practices of the colonial state, large numbers of
Africans had lost their land, became no- to low-wage laborers on settler farms, or
were marginalized in urban cities.

Patron-client relations continued into independent Kenya with African
leaders through their tribal affiliations. The new African leaders replicated much of
the behavior that the colonial authorities passed on to them at independence in 1963,
resulting in a legacy of intense tribal rivalry for power and control of state resources
in the postcolonial period, what Berman (1998) called ―the politics of uncivil
nationalism‖ (405). The colonial legacy and the rivalry among the tribal groups made
liberalization in Kenya, to the extent it occurred during the Moi presidency, more a
function of these intrinsic domestic factors than external actors.
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The political structure, social relations, and general conduct of the polity
handed over to the political elite gave rise to deep ethnic divisions, which were
manifested in intense ethnic politics and became one of the focal points of Kenya‘s
postcolonial politics. Ethnic divisions led to the creation of parties along ethnic lines,
which later contributed to the marginalization of certain parties, which translated into
the marginalization of certain ethnic groups. Alemazung (2010) notes that:
Ethnic groups who feel marginalized often develop feelings of
revenge and hatred against those who enjoy socio-economic wellbeing from the resources of their [state] because of their affiliation
to the ruler (the ‗owner‘ or ‗controller‘ of the national cake) based
on clientelist politicking (65-66).
Kenya experienced this type of ethnic fragmentation as the different ethnic groups
exerted pressure on the state to reform.

By the time Kenya gained independence from Britain in 1963 ethnic tension
was primed to be a major factor in national politics and political leaders sought to
consolidate their respective tribes and parties. The Kikuyu and Luo elites, who saw
Nairobi and urban areas as central to strengthening their political dominance, catered
to the prevailing interests there—the financial industry and large landowners who
engaged in agricultural trade. The efforts of the other parties centered on smallholder
interests in rural areas, as the smaller ethnic groups were limited to these areas. It
became an intense struggle among leaders of these ethnic-based parties for the
control of the state and its resources and Kenya‘s first two post-colonial presidents
exemplified the practice of ethnic rivalry (Ndegwa 1997).
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2.6

Ethnic Affinities and State Resources

Jomo Kenyatta, a member of Kenya‘s largest tribe, the Kikuyu, served as
prime minister during the transition to independence and became the first
postcolonial President. A resident in Britain for 15 years, Kenyatta was well versed
in British politics and used his familiarity with Britain to influence public opinion
about Kenya and against colonialism in Kenya. He was one of the leaders of the Mau
Mau rebellion (1953-56) and one of the negotiators with Britain for Kenya‘s
independence. He was elected President 1964 and served as president until his death
in August 1978 (Branch and Cheeseman 2006).

Kenyatta ran KANU and the state as client-patron operations. Amutabi
(2009) notes:
Kenyatta perfected the reward system and ‗divide and rule‘ policies
which had been used by the colonial system. He rewarded those
who supported him and was often accused of engaging in some
form of ‗Kikuyunisation‘ or negative ethnicity in the process (58).
Kenyatta‘s efforts to ―Africanize‖ the civil service agencies favored his ethnic group
in filling the posts. Ministerial and cabinet posts went to Kikuyu members, including
Commerce, Planning and Development, and Education Ministries. Kenyatta‘s critics
and potential challengers were marginalized, or worse. In addition to being removed
from their positions, some were detained and served long prison sentences; others
were killed or died under suspicious circumstances (Amutabi 2009).
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His policies disproportionately benefited members of his ethnic group, who
were favored with opportunities in the private sector such as joint ventures and
appointments to directorship and management of businesses. During President
Kenyatta‘s presidency (1963-1978), Kikuyu representation in permanent secretary
positions was 31 percent and averaged 29 percent of cabinet posts while they
represented 21 percent of the population. The Kalenjin held 6 percent of permanent
secretaries; the Kamba, Luo, and Luhya, had 13 percent, 12 percent, and 9 percent
respectively (Kanyinga 2004).

Parastatals such as the Industrial and Commercial Development Corporation
and the Kenya National Trading Corporation, two key agencies designed to provide
credit and other technical support to Kenyan entrepreneurs, were under the control of
Kikuyu political appointees and many of their services were extended
disproportionately to Kikuyu entrepreneurs versus entrepreneurs from other ethnic
groups. In addition, land issues were settled in favor of Kikuyu members. Kenyatta
settled large numbers of Kikuyu people on ex-settlers‘ farms in the Rift Valley,
historical areas of non-Kikuyu tribes (Bigsten and Moene 1993; Ogachi 1999).
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2.7

Private Property Rights to Land

The arguments for land tenure reform were similar to those made in favor of
liberalizing any sector of the economy. The proponents argued that in order for any
agricultural development program to be successful, it had to be based on policies that
addressed land tenure more than on actual agrarian reform. They argued that
individualized ownership was the key to investment, especially in rural or smallscale farming. It was argued that individualized land tenure would make it easier for
farmers to have access to credit and other farm-related services such as research and
extension. Privatization and individualization of land was also considered important
because it would restrict state intervention, which was said to distort market forces.
Individual landowners would be left unencumbered to make rational choices about
the use of their land (Dorner 1972). In order for a liberalized land tenure to become a
reality, the proponents of liberalization had to dismiss customary and communal
ownership as lacking the incentives of a privatized system to foster investment and
innovation in agriculture. In the proponents‘ view, the customary system was lacking
because individuals had no incentive to invest and improve the land since the returns
on their investment would also be enjoyed by others in the community. Because of
these shortcomings in Kenya‘s customary ownership system, an individualized and
private system was said to be best suited for agricultural development (Harrison
1987).
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From 1963 to the mid-1970s, the postcolonial government continued on the
path to land tenure reform and support to farmers in three ways. The African leaders
were convinced that these were the best ways for agricultural development. They
sought to support smallholder farmers and believed that in order for such support to
be sustainable farmers should have individual rights to land ownership. The first step
in the process was to introduce legislation moving land use from a customary or
indigenous system to one of individualized, private property system. Second, some
of the ex-settlers‘ agricultural lands were distributed to small farmers. The change to
private property rights allowed smallholder farmers to register their land, receive
title, and use the title as collateral for access to credit to whatever extent possible.
Third, the leaders encouraged Harambee (self-help) projects (Burgess 1997).

Table 2 below outlines the legal framework that moved Kenya away from a
customary system of land rights to one of an individualized property rights system
(Bank 1969; Bank 1998).
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Table 2: Laws Affirming Individual Land Rights
Customary Land Tenure Practice
(Policy Before Change)
Land belonged to whole tribe and
grazing areas used by the community.
This type of tenure could not induce
individual interests to generate market
activities.

Change
Year
1963

Statutory Land Rights
(After Change)
The Registered Land Act
Made it legal for land to be
owned privately and registered
in an individual‘s name. This
type of tenure could induce
individual interests to generate
market activities.

No system linking large farms/estates
1964
once owned by white settlers in the
Highlands, Rift Valley, and other parts of
the country.

Land Trust Act
Ex-settlers lands were turned
over to the state to be held in
trust for the Kenyan people.

Customary system made it difficult for
individual to divide land. Division may
be useful to sell in parcels, which would
facilitate land markets.

1967

Land Division Act
Gave individuals the right to
sub-divide their land.

Lack of legal institutions to adjudicate
land settlement and disputes.

1968

Land Adjudication Act
Created judicial systems to
resolve land disputes and other
related matters.

The settlement lands were returned to the government through negotiation,
with Britain acting as the representative of the settlers. Some parts of the land were
earmarked to be transferred to individual households and other parts were to be held
in trust. President Kenyatta, understanding that he had to shore up his internal
supporters, primarily drawn from his Kikuyu ethnic group, designed a system
favorable to the Kikuyu to have access to settlement land, especially in the Rift
Valley and Central Province. From the early 1960s to the mid-1970s, the government
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instituted a series of land transfer programs. Table 3 lists the land transfer schemes
most discussed in Kenya‘s history.

Table 3: Land Transfers
(a) Small Holder Settlement
Scheme
Area (hectares)
Million Acre
490,707
Harambee
6,259
Haraka
57,080
Source: (Maxon 1992:275)

Num. of Holdings
35,401
431
15,480

(b) Large Farms
Scheme

Area
(hectares)
Ol Kalou
56,000
Shirika
108,627
Private Sale
600,000
Source: (Maxon 1992:275)

Num. of
Holdings
86
105
N/A

Num. of
Families
2,000
12,000
N/A

These tables show the amount of land transferred from settlers to the
government, which then distributed it to families. For example, the Million Acre
Scheme consisted of 490,707 hectares of land. The government divided the land into
35,401 holdings and then distributed them to families. Transfers in Table 3(a)
became central to Kenya‘s smallholder agricultural production which accounts for
the vast majority of Kenya‘s total agricultural output (60 percent of Kenya‘s tea,
Arabica coffee, and milk) (Ochieng 2006; Ponte 2002; Kenya 1988).
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Government officials were responsible for assigning the plots to individuals
or families on a case-by-case basis. Those who received a parcel were granted 30year mortgages at 5 percent interest, payable to the central government. A Central
Land Board was established to secure the titles of the land until the new owners met
their financial obligations. As early as 1966, approximately 20 percent of the land in
the Highlands had been transferred to smallholder farmers through the various statefinanced and/or supported programs. In addition to these state-run programs, the
Kenyatta government also encouraged the creation of land buying companies (Boone
2009).

The land buying companies (LBCs) were either strictly private or publicprivate partnerships. They bought or leased large farms or estates from the
government and parceled them out to individual families. According to Maxon
(1992), more than 70 percent of large farms were in the Rift Valley. Most of the
LBCs were owned by influential members of Kenyatta‘s ethnic group and
government supporters who bought much of the land through state-provided
financing. Large numbers of Kikuyus bought lands from these LBCs and settled in
the Rift Valley. Leaders of other non-Kikuyu ethnic groups, including Vice President
Jaramogi Oginga Odinga (Luo) and Minister Ronald Ngala (Mijikenda), complained
about lack of transparency and public corruption in these processes and those who
traditionally occupied the Rift Valley protested Kikuyu encroachment. Unhappy with
their criticisms, President Kenyatta marginalized these leaders. Odinga was forced
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out of the vice presidency and Ngala died suspiciously in a roadside accident
(Amutabi 2009; Boone 2009).

This history of land tenure reform under President Kenyatta—transfer from
settlers to the Kenyan government and from the government to individuals to hold
privately—set in motion two issues that would come to define Kenyan politics for
decades (and still does today). The first was distrust of the Kikuyu community by
non-Kikuyu groups in the Rift Valley who considered the land tenure system
established by the Kenyatta government to unjustly favor the Kikuyu. The second,
related to trust, was the way in which President Kenyatta forced Vice President
Odinga out of his government in 1966 over issues of corruption and macroeconomic
development policies. Kenyatta‘s intolerance of dissent set a precedent, later
followed by Moi as president (Amutabi 2009).

Liberalization of land ownership tenure encountered a series of domestic
challenges. One of the main challenges had to do with tradition. Despite the new
laws allowing individualized land ownership, the farmers‘ perception and
understanding of the content of individualized land rights and the power they had did
not change. This perception was strongest among smallholders. Part of the argument
for moving away from customary land ownership to an individualized one was that
the latter would eventually give rise to a land market as individuals were able to sell
and/or buy parcels of land. The Registered Land Act of 1963 specifically made the
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point that the right of the individual superseded all other rights not officially
mentioned in the register. As part of the reforms, the Act converted all ―customary
rights of occupation‖ into tenant rights of one year. This change gave the registered
owner the power, after a year‘s notice, the right to terminate the occupancy of any
tenant (Okoth-Ogendo [No Year]).

The reform also countered two other problems. First, Okoth-Ogendo‘s
research showed that smallholder farmers did not know how to value their lands.
When asked hypothetically, how much they would ask for a plot if they had to sell it,
most of them named such a high price that it would automatically price them out of
the market. To these farmers ―the land was still regarded basically as a ‗family
investment‘ and one that could not be parted with [except] in exceptional
circumstances‖ (7), which may explain why they would ask such a high price for it.
It may also be symbolic of the notion that the land was considered priceless.

Second, the reform law faced the challenge of lineage ties. Okoth-Ogendo
surveyed farmers in Kisii and South Nyanza who were living on lands for which they
did not have registered titles. The research found that 95 percent of the farmers said
they were on a particular land because it belonged to their familial lineage. They also
noted that ―since the registered proprietors themselves had received the land more
often by inheritance or family partition than by purchase or gift, they had no moral
right to exclude other members of the family from it‖ (7). Despite reform, many
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farmers expected the customary principles around land use and other practices to
remain. For some tribes the possibility that they could be removed by registered
landowners from the land on which they had lived for generations was startling.
Table 4 lists responses of respondents to a hypothetical question asking what they
would do if a registered owner of the land they were living on were to ask them to
leave. The respondents were unregistered tenants in Kisii and South Nyanza, both in
southwestern Kenya.

Table 4: Unregistered Tenants‘ Reactions to Hypothetical Survey Questions
Reaction of unregistered tenants to hypothetical
question: what would you do if a registered owner of
the land were to ask you to leave?5

Kisii
N=64

South Nyanza
N=23

Can‘t conceive of being asked to leave the land
Would demand his/her share from the registered owner
Would move willingly
Would go to court
Would buy land elsewhere
Total

28%
55%
12%
3%
2%
100%

87%
5%
4%
4%
0%
100%

In the view of these tribal members, registered landowners ―had no exclusive
rights to the land‖ (Okoth-Ogendo [No Year]:8), they simply couldn‘t fathom being
asked to leave, and the majority would not do so willingly. These data indicate that
the farmers in these parts of the country did not accept the notion of private,
individualized property rights. The low numbers of those who said they would go to
5

Author turned statement into question form.
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court also indicated lack of enthusiasm for and/or trust in or understanding of the
legal system to address land issues.

In addition to affecting farmers‘ attitudes regarding land rights, customary
traditions also influenced how the Land Control Boards adjudicated land disputes.
Many Land Control Boards refused to approve complete transfers of land or
subdivisions (despite the existence of laws making these transactions legal) unless
family members approved. There were many instances where the Land Control
Boards required applicants to bring family members as witnesses to prove consent to
land transactions (MacKenzie 1986). In some cases, even if family members granted
approval, the family had to show ownership of land elsewhere to ensure ―alternative
means of subsistence‖ (Okoth-Ogendo [No Year]:8). The requirements of having the
approval of family members and/or proving credible proof of other means of
subsistence negated, or at least severely minimized, the power of the legal registry.
The legal registry was developed to help reduce the burden on landowners. Once
they could show that the land was indeed theirs, traditional customs were not
supposed to hinder what landowners could do with their property.

These reforms were happening in an environment where many ethnic groups
believed that they had suffered major injustices. They believed they first lost their
land to the white settlers and then to Kikuyus in the immediate years after
independence with this individualized land tenure system and through the land
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buying companies. A summary of this sentiment of deep resentment of Kikuyus was
reported in The New York Times after the post-2007 election violence. This statement
is relevant to Kenya any time since independence:
In the Rift Valley, the anti-Kikuyu grudge goes back to independence, when
the British government bought out Britons who owned huge, picturesque
farms. But instead of redistributing that land to the impoverished people who
had lived here for centuries, like the Kalenjin and Maasai, the newly formed
Kenyan government, led by Jomo Kenyatta, a Kikuyu, gave much of it to
Kikuyus from other areas (Gettleman 2008).

2.8

Conclusion

This chapter presented a historical overview showing how colonial policies
and practices led to the marginalization of Kenyans. Internal pressures from tribal
groups caused the colonial authorities to reform granting more freedoms and rights
to Kenyans. The legacies of the colonial period carried over to the first postcolonial
government. One of the primary commonalities between the colonial and the
Kenyatta governments was that their policies favored certain groups at the expense
of others. Another legacy of the colonial system that filtered to the postcolonial
government was the system of private property rights to land. In both periods some
groups were advantaged at the expense of others, contributing to deep ethnic
divisions and internal tensions.

The internal tensions and rivalry, as shown in the chapter, filtered into other
areas of society, primarily in public employment and other uses of state-owned
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resources, which deepened state intervention in the economy, setting the context for
the trajectory of Kenya‘s liberalization under the Moi government after the death of
President Jomo Kenyatta in 1978. By explicating the nature of the internal actors,
policies and practices during the colonial and Kenyatta governments, this chapter
shed light on and set the context for the actors that were to become key players in the
efforts for liberalization in Kenya. In essence, one cannot fully understand the
internal factors that forced Kenya to liberalize without a good grasp of the linkages
between the colonial government, the Kenyatta government, and the Moi
government. The next chapter furthers the examination of the influence of the
policies and practices of the Kenyatta government on the Moi government and how
these issues contributed to Kenya‘s movement toward liberalization.
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CHAPTER THREE
MOI, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PRESSURES: KENYA MOVING
TOWARD REFORM

Kenya has numerous tribal groups varying greatly in their size and
development, and among all the consciousness of separation
remains prominent. Not only has the tribe continued to command
the loyalty and identity of most individuals, but social and political
changes have encouraged this (Gertzel, Goldschmidt, and Rothchild
1972:103).6
Daniel arap Moi, Kenya‘ second postcolonial president, was a pivotal figure
on the country‘s path to political and economic liberalization. He inherited a
government dominated by members of a rival tribe who did not trust him and did not
want to give up any of the control and power they had. This chapter explores the Moi
presidency, how he marginalized Kenya‘s politically active ethnic groups, primarily
the Kikuyu and Luo, after he came to power in 1978, and how internal and external
pressures forced him to concede to liberalization. The chapter concentrates on the
Moi presidency (1978-2002) because that is the focus of this dissertation and it was
also the period in which the World Bank and the IMF began a concerted effort to
liberalize Kenya‘s economy.
Daniel arap Moi was a member of the third largest tribal group in Kenya, the
Kalenjin.7 He had been in politics since before independence, first elected to the
Legislative Council in 1955 to represent the Rift Valley and in 1960 he was one of
6 Italics, mine.
7

He is still alive.
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the two principal founders of the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU) Party.
After independence, President Kenyatta appointed him Minister for Home Affairs
and in 1967 he was named Kenyatta‘s Vice President.

Despite serving as Vice President for over a decade, Moi was considered an
outsider to Kenyatta‘s allies. As Kenyatta neared death, his allies sought to change
the Constitution to bar automatic succession of the vice president to the presidency.
To counter their campaign, Moi launched a campaign of his own, traveling the
country promising the politics of Nyayo—to follow in the footsteps—implying that
he would follow in the footsteps of Kenyatta. Moi‘s campaign was successful, the
―Change the Constitution‖ movement failed, and he became president after the death
of Kenyatta in 1978 (Throup 1993).

Once in power, however, President Moi sought to break the Kikuyu and Luo
political dominance by uniting the other Kalenjin-affiliated ethnic groups—the
Nandis, Marakwets, Keiyos, and Pokots—as a way to counter the Kikuyu and Luo.
Part of his effort involved breaking the Kikuyu Central Association (S. Ambrose,
personal correspondence, January 15, 2012). Throup (1987) described the Kikuyu
Central Association as involving a group of ―proto-capitalists‖ which, during the
Kenyatta reign, ―legitimized the accumulation of land and capital […] within the
framework of a revitalized traditional mythology‖ (6). President Moi‘s strategy of
marginalizing the Kikuyu elite also involved breaking up the Gikuyu, Embu, and
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Meru Association (GEMA), a group that was considered to be the strongest
supporters of former President Kenyatta and protectors of Kikuyu dominance
(Kanyinaga 1994).

3.1

Ethnic Rivalry

Moi came to power in a climate of deep-seated ethnic rivalry, a rivalry that
began in the 1950s as preparations were being made for Kenya to be transferred from
the colonial government to the Kenyan nationalists. Ethnic-affiliated community
associations that were created prior to independence were transformed into political
parties but retained their ethnic affinities. Rivalry over land, public employment, and
overall control of the state festered among the three political and/or economically
relevant groups: Kikuyu, Kalenjin, and Luo. Many of Kenya‘s tribes viewed the
Kikuyu as being the most advantaged and resented it. Barkan (2011) explains this
resentment of the Kikuyu as a direct legacy of the colonial government which
established ―a system of racial segregation‖ and built an economy around the white
settler communities. ―The British then concentrated infrastructural and economic
development in the settler areas and in Nairobi to support the settler economy,‖
including social services and education (4).
Kikuyu benefited the most from these services by virtue of residing in the
closest proximity to settler areas. ―Over time the Kikuyu became the most educated
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group, a position they have never relinquished and that has been protected and
encouraged by Kikuyu leaders throughout the post-independence period‖ (Barkan
2011:5). They enjoyed a disproportionate share of the country‘s middle class wealth
and privileges and other ethnic groups tried to limit their political and economic
power and influence.

The Kenyatta administration had major implications for the political and
economic structures that came about under the subsequent Moi administration,
including the emergence and nature of political dissent. Holmquist, Weaver, and
Ford (1994) have called it the ―politics of dissent under the label of democracy‖ (71).
Similar to Kenyatta before him, Moi pursued ―clientelist politics informed by a
strong ideology of ethnic competition‖ (Holmquist, Weaver, and Ford 1994:80),
which led to a de jure one-party system in 1982. Corruption, economic decline,
political repression, and a general sense of malaise and fatigue with the authoritarian
President Moi empowered domestic actors from various sectors of society to
organize, develop and extend protest- and self-help organizations to demand political
and economic reform during the period from 1982 to 2002.

Ethnic rivalry filtered through the political discourse in Kenya especially
when people thought they were in ―safe‖ company, or in ―polite political discourse.‖
Individuals from one ethnic groups would precede an insult of a rival from another
ethnic group, for example, with ―people of the milk‖ to refer to the Kalenjin and
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Maasai, both pastoralist livestock-rearing tribes; a ―certain community‖ or anything
associated with Mount Kenya to refer to the Kikuyu, who concentrate in that area;
and ―the people of the lake‖ or ―those from the west‖ to refer to the Luo who live
along the basin of Lake Victoria (Email correspondence, Ambrose 2012; Wong
2009).

Favoring of Kikuyu changed when Moi became president. During the Moi
presidency (1978-2002), the percentage of permanent secretaries filled by Kalenjin
increased from six percent to between 22 and 30 percent. The share of positions held
by the Kikuyu dropped to 20 percent from around 30 percent and declined further to
10 percent between 1994 and 2001. These distribution patterns were also reflected in
the civil service sector (Kanyinga 2004). These changes reflected how the state and
state resources were used to support the ethnic groups of the presidents.

Interviews for this research in Kenya in July 2010 revealed continued
resentment among former civil servants (Kikuyu) for losing their positions under the
Moi government. They recounted how positions in the civil service sector were
based on tribal affiliation. One Kikuyu woman recounted how she was laid off or
―forced to retire‖ in the 1980s ―by Moi‖ and was ―replaced by one of Moi‘s people,‖
illustrating what scholars have broadly explained in the literature about Kenya and
ethnic politics (Holmquist, Weaver, and Ford 1994; Jonyo 2002; Klopp 2001). This
deeply rooted ethnic rivalry played a major role in the debates about liberalization
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and the extent to which it took place in Kenya. The rivalry and competition to catch
up with the Kikuyu politically and economically in a country with limited
opportunities was central to other groups‘ efforts to gain control of the state—since
such control was the best way to achieve wealth and prestige.

3.2

Harambee

The deeply rooted tribal tradition of Harambee gained official recognition
and institutional prominence in 1963 when President Kenyatta used it to praise the
importance of collective voluntary initiatives in development projects. Communities
organized themselves and their resources in Harambee to build local schools and
health clinics, to dig wells and cattle dips. In 1976, a government study found that
Harambee contributions accounted for 40 percent of capital development in rural
areas, and in 1986, it was estimated that Harambee provided between four and ten
percent of the government‘s annual development expenditure (Kenya 1988:29). Over
time, Harambee initiatives became heavily political; as they grew, their projects
became more important to development. Even though Harambee projects
traditionally received government support, member contributions in the form of cash
and labor, especially in the first decade after independence, were their principal
source of support.
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Harambee became closely associated with President Kenyatta, especially the
community-based, collective or development- from- below approach. He perceived
this type of community organizing to help each other as indicative of Kenyan
culture. As the leadership of KANU began to shift from Kikuyu to Kalenjin when
Moi came to power in 1978, tension in Harambee began to emerge. Ngau (1987)
argued that the tensions were the result of changes in how the political elites and
professional class would have to relate to Harambee to build political constituencies
as they sought public office and access to the state. These intense tensions emanated
―from the realities of Kenya‘s class structure, especially the role of the elite in selfhelp leadership, and from bureaucratic and professional behavior patterns of the
Kenyan government‖ (Ngau 1987:528).

The political significance of Harambee was that after independence it
became one of the primary means by which politicians could establish constituencies
by supporting and even initiating community projects, and through their influence in
the government and/or private sector raise funds for them. As a result, communities
that needed projects had them undertaken; local civil servants advanced their careers
as development agents, and some local elites used Harambee funds for their personal
use. The Moi government increased its scrutiny and regulations of Harambee in
1979 through the Ministry of Social Services, local and regional community
development committees (CDCs), and by demanding a number of requirements
before communities could work on Harambee.
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Related to that major shift between the Kenyatta and Moi periods with
respect to the operation of Harambee was the shift in type of contribution, as
President Moi sought to undermine the Harambee movement to restructure it to fit
his politics of Nyayo. As Moi consolidated his power, the concept of Nyayo came to
be understood by the political elite as politics from the top down or the politics of
following orders from the top as opposed to Harambee, with its bottom-up approach.
As a result, the form or type of member support (labor and cash) changed.

During the Kenyatta presidency, people supported Harambee primarily by
contributing their labor to community-based projects. Contributing one‘s labor to
Harambee was an indication that people approved of the projects, wanted to be
associated with them, and wanted to see them completed. During the Moi
presidency, on the other hand, contributions were predominantly cash, which could
be more easily reallocated and used for different projects and purposes. The
increased proportion of cash in the movement, from 42 percent in 1965 to 68 percent
in 1984, created an environment more conducive to corruption. This change in
Harambee and other changes requiring government approval of certain projects were
viewed as a shift in how the Moi government planned to relate to wananchi (the
citizenry)—micro managing and more heavy-handed than Kenyatta. People began to
disassociate themselves from the movement as it was becoming closely linked with
the Moi government. Corruption by the political and economic elite was on the rise
and people felt increasingly marginalized by the regime (Ngau 1987).
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Government intrusions into and restrictions on the Harambee movement,
embezzlement, and corruption led to frustration and resentment. Communities
became disillusioned and demanded reform of Harambee as a conduit to demanding
reform of the Moi government, especially corruption. To assuage these demands,
President Moi issued a code of ethics for leaders engaging in Harambee projects. As
Harambee was associated with President Kenyatta, a Kikuyu, the Kikuyu
community viewed President Moi‘s restrictions and intrusions as a threat to them and
their Harambee. This call for Harambee reform became part of the call for broad
reform of government institutions and policies. Their demands were framed as being
necessary to combat corruption in all sectors and to generate economic growth (Ngau
1987).

3.3

Economic Decline

As Gourevitch (1986) notes, the ―fat years and the lean ones are, of course,
interconnected.‖ They both force change, but ―it is the crisis years that put systems
under stress‖ (9). This basic observation of the ability of crisis to test systems, in
Kenya‘s case, economic crisis, is very appropriate to the Moi government in the
1980s as it struggled to navigate the pressures to liberalize, including pressures from
a rapidly deteriorating economy caused by falling world commodity prices and steep
increases in world oil prices. To ensure that his presidency was not undermined by
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his Kikuyu rivals, President Moi anticipated eventual economic reform, but whatever
the nature of the reforms, he did not want to be left weakened and unable to control
public resources for political advantage.

However, the pressure caused by economic decline, ethnic rivalry, public
corruption and repression limited Moi‘s ability to resist and delay liberalizing reform
in the 1990s. As scholars such as Holmquist et al. (1994) have noted:

The economy slowed down in the 1970s, hampering the regime‘s
ability to use patronage to stem opposition. This became a greater
problem as the 1980s wore on. […]. By 1982, the economy was in
further decline and the number of strikes increased (91).

As a result, the government was not able ―to maintain a large state sector and juggle
political tensions generated by the economic sectors and ethnic calculations in a
strategy of rule‖ (ibid.).

The first ten years of Kenya‘s independence are sometimes referred to as the
―Golden Years‖ because of the country‘s impressive record of economic growth and
social progress. During that decade, the country saw respectable economic growth,
as GDP averaged 6.6 percent per year and per capita income grew at an average rate
of 2.6 percent annually. The decade of 1980-1990, on the other hand, is sometimes
referred to as the ―Lost Decade,‖ as it was characterized by economic decline and
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increased social and political unrest leading to political and civic groups agitating for
reform. The period of economic decline started in the mid-1970s following the first
oil shock of 1973 and grew progressively worse in the 1980s. Between 1980 and
1989, the average rate of per capita income growth was only 0.4 percent, and
between 1990 and 1995, the rate fell to -0.3 percent (Kenya 1997).

The Kenyan government reported that from 1980 to 1996 there had been
virtually no improvement in the living standards of the population and the welfare of
the majority of people, in fact, had declined as measured by the increase in the
number of Kenyans living below the absolute poverty line. Moreover, the number of
the unemployed and underemployed rose during the same period, 1980 to 1996.
Employment opportunities were not being created fast enough to keep up with an
expanding labor force. More than 300,000 youth were joining the labor market every
year but only 7 percent of them would find employment. Throughout the 1980s
Kenya‘s capital stock fell to 2.7 percent annually, compared to a yearly average of
7.1 percent in the 1970s (Kenya 1997). Youth employment later became one of the
major reasons behind students‘ protests and demands on the Moi government for
reform.

In addition to the oil shocks of the 1970s, the decline of Kenya‘s terms of
trade, domestic inflation in the early 1980s, and general policy mismanagement also
contributed to the country‘s economic downturn. Among the areas that many
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complained were grossly mismanaged was the civil service sector. The government
increased the public sector by creating extra positions in major ministries. While the
government of Kenya always used the public sector as a way to issue largesse to
political supporters, the scale of expansion rose significantly in the 1980s. Between
1974 and 1984, excluding teachers, total wage employment in the national
government increased by 7.4 percent annually compared to 2.8 percent in the private
sector. As a result, public employees‘ salaries as a share of recurrent government
expenditure increased from 47 percent in 1979/1980 to 60 percent in 1984/1985.
Salaries in the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock Development rose the most,
from 60 to 90 percent. Rising oil prices also took an enormous toll: by the end of
1980, Kenya was spending 50 percent of its foreign exchange earnings on oil while
at the same time prices of commodities such as coffee and tea were in decline
(Kenya 1988:32).

Another economic driver of reform had to do with the state‘s budgetary
difficulties, one of the most significant of which was high levels of loss generated by
state-owned enterprises. Kenya invested an estimated USD $1.4 billion in its
parastatals between 1963 and 1984. This assessment was confirmed in 1986 in a
study of 16 major Kenyan agricultural and agro-industrial parastatals. The study
showed aggregate losses for the years 1977 to 1984 totaling USD $183 million at
1986 exchange rates. An analysis of that investment showed that even with all of the
―concessions and special privileges public enterprises in developing countries enjoy,
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the rate of return on the estimated investment was 0.4 percent, which implies that a
fair number of the enterprises have consistently been loss makers‖ (Nellis and Kikeri
1989:661). Many of these enterprises were grain marketing boards, a large portion of
whose losses could be attributed to government pricing and purchasing policies. As
these losses mounted, liberalization was viewed as necessary ―to broaden the role of
market signals and align relative prices more closely with those in world markets.‖
Among the key sectors that the government listed to liberalize were agriculture,
industry and trade, and the financial sector. The Kenyan government called the need
to reform, ―a departure from previous practice‖ (Kenya 1997:4; Kenya 2002; Nellis
and Kikeri 1989).

These economic challenges created enormous political and social pressures
on the government and, in order for the government to be viewed as credible, new
policies were necessary. The internal pressures for reform convinced the Moi
government to seek outside assistance, as the country was in need of resources to
implement any reform. It was then (1980) that Kenya accepted its first concessional
loan from the World Bank.
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3.4

The Power of Popular Pressure

As previously noted, when President Moi came to office, he quickly sought
to consolidate his power. During the first three years of his government, many
prominent Kikuyu were forced out of KANU. In 1982, following a failed coup d‘état
against him, Moi made his most overt policy statement by amending Kenya‘s
Constitution to outlaw opposition political parties. The constitutional change made
KANU the only legal political party in Kenya. Moi argued that the multi-party
system encouraged ethnic discord, which was the same argument that President
Kenyatta made in 1966 when he recruited leaders of other parties to join KANU.
Leaders of the other political parties protested Moi‘s constitutional change and were
joined by civic and religious organizations condemning the one-party system. They
accused President Moi of legalizing and legitimizing repression through one-party
rule. Political opposition and civic leaders saw banning other political parties as
closing the national political space. The government‘s action helped strengthen and
expand the base of opposition to President Moi‘s policies and practices (Murungi
2000; S. Ambrose, personal communication, February 5, 2012)

The year 1982 marked the beginning of the period in which people opposed
to the one-party system of government became increasingly public and vocal in their
opposition. As political and civic leaders continued to condemn President Moi‘s
actions, he sought to further consolidate his power and influence by barring them
69

from politics or making it difficult for groups with which they were affiliated to
operate, even disbanding some of them. President Moi used his executive power to
disband the Kenya Union of Civil Servants, the Kikuyu-based Gikuyu Embu Meru
Association and the University Academic Staff Union (UASU). When the
government was criticized by the academic establishment, President Moi ordered a
crackdown on university professors. Many UASU officials were detained without
charges or indicted on charges under sections of the Preservation of Public Security
Act (Murungi 2000).
Political leaders who voiced opposition to President Moi‘s constitutional
change were also detained. Among them, Raila Odinga, Kenya‘s current Prime
Minister and son of Jaramogi Odinga who was Kenyatta‘s first Vice-president, was
charged with treason. Other prominent anti-single party rule activists were detained
without charges though many of them were later released. Others were tried and
received long prison sentences. In addition to political leaders and activists, the
religious community emerged in opposition to one-party rule as well. A key figure in
this effort was Reverend Timothy Njoya from St. Andrews Church in Nairobi. In one
of his sermons, Reverend Njoya called on President Moi ―to abolish detention
without trial during peace time and to invite dissidents, detainees, and exiles…for
dialogue‖ (Murungi 2000:17).

Rev. Njoya was, in effect, one of the first in Kenya to oppose one-party rule,
and was arrested numerous times for his activities challenging the government.
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Another in the religious community recruited to support reform was Bedan Mbugua,
the former editor of the National Council of Churches of Kenya's (NCCK) magazine
Beyond, who would later become very important in the official political opposition
party, Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (FORD) (Kanyinga, Kiondo,
Tidemand, and Gibbon 1994).

By 1990, student and opposition protests that first started in Nairobi and
surrounding areas, which were predominantly Kikuyu and Luo, spread to other
locations throughout the country. In addition to economic hardships, protestors‘
concerns ranged from conditions at public universities to political assassinations.
When demonstrations were characterized as political, the government resorted to
coercive force to suppress them. Popular protests against the Moi government
intensified when mourners at Foreign Mister Robert Ouko‘s funeral were fired on by
paramilitary forces, allegedly at President Moi‘s order. Minister Ouko was allegedly
killed by government security forces close to President Moi because he was close to
completing an inquiry into public corruption in which close associates of the
president were said to be involved in graft and theft of public resources (Bratton and
Walle 1992).

These protests culminated in what was known as saba saba (seven seven),
referring to July 7, 1990, the day a protest in favor of multi-parties in Kenya was
scheduled in the Kamukunji neighborhood in Nairobi. On the eve of the gathering,
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the leaders of the movement, including Kenneth Matiba, Charles Rubia, and Paul
Muite were arrested and detained and thirty people were killed. The opposition
became extremely intense as more people began to express more public opposition to
the Moi government (Gekara 2010; Ochieng 2010).

3.5

External Pressure as a Complement to Internal Pressure
International financial institutions (IFIs) have played a role in Kenya‘s

economy since the early 1960s. The World Bank gave Kenya its first financial
support in 1960 during the transition from colonialism to independence. Its first
agricultural sector loan of $8.4 million was issued in 1961 and between 1961 and
1997, the Bank provided 41 loans or credit to the Kenyan government to develop and
liberalize the agricultural sector. The IMF provided its first postcolonial financial
assistance to Kenya in 1973. From 1975 to 2000 the IMF‘s Board of Directors
approved 12 additional loans for Kenya. Appendix C presents a list of World Bank
loans to Kenya for the agricultural sector since 1960 and Appendix D lists IMF‘s
loans (Bank 1998; Mussa and Savastano 1999; O'Brien and Ryan 2001).

The purpose of World Bank and IMF assistance was liberalization to generate
economic growth and to facilitate political stability. They were only marginally
successful, however, in achieving these goals in Kenya. The World Bank conducted
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an evaluation of its various assistance programs in Kenya from 1961 to 1997 and
assessed many of its programs there as unsatisfactory. While its 1986 agricultural
capacity-building program was assessed marginally satisfactory, 30 of 41 programs
were evaluated in 1998 and 50 percent of them were assessed unsatisfactory. The
World Bank argued that the poor performance of its projects in the 1970s and 80s
was due primarily to the poor macroeconomic and domestic agricultural policy
environment that existed under the Kenyatta and Moi governments. Both the IMF
and World Bank used their funding as leverage to press for economic reform. When
Kenya signed on to the IMF/World Bank‘s structural adjustment programs (SAPs) in
1980, one of the conditions was to reform Kenya‘s National Cereals and Produce
Board (NCPB). Despite receiving a number of loans, however, the NCPB went
without significant reform until 1992 when private investors were first allowed to
enter the grain market (Bank 1998).

Earlier loans had been extended to Kenya as a response to the first oil price
shock of October 1973. The government received a concession loan in 1979/80 to
help stabilize its economy and to allow it space to begin its reform process. This loan
was followed by two agricultural sector loans in 1982 and 1986 both of which were
conditioned on Kenya reforming the sector. After the second world oil price shock in
1979, the IFIs shifted their focus from agricultural project lending to policy reform in
Kenya. The IFIs expressly ―aimed to liberalize agricultural pricing and to improve
economic efficiency in agricultural marketing.‖ The loans were also given ―to boost
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project planning and management capacity, including some land policy reform‖
(Bank 1998:21).

Donor funds to Kenya averaged 9 percent of GDP between 1970 and 1999,
which accounted for about 20 percent of the annual government budget and financed
over 80 percent of the country‘s development expenditures. Aid flow increased
significantly over time, from an annual average of US$205 million in the 1970s to
slightly over US$1 billion in the 1990s. The aid inflows exceeded the total receipts
from all other foreign exchange earners and at the same time Kenya was ranked the
eighth-largest aid recipient in the world (Mussa and Savastano 1999; Njehu 2003).

As financial aid to Kenya increased, the conditionality terms of these loans
became increasingly stringent. The tightening of the terms, however, only came
about after President Moi came under intense domestic pressure to reform. From
early 1989 through the summer of 1990, internal pressure and demands on Moi to
allow multiparty politics and elections had increased. The government responded to
the internal pressures by cracking down on pro-multiparty activists on July 7, 1990,
resulting in more than twenty deaths (Murungi 2000). The first IFI attempt, in line
with domestic actors‘ demands, to intensify pressure on the government came in
November 1991 in Paris at the multi-donor Kenyan Consultative Group meeting. At
that meeting, the donors agreed to suspend quick-disbursement aid to Kenya for at
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least six months until the government made ―improvements in terms of economic
and political reforms‖ (Mailafia 1997:31).

The Consultative Group meeting also declined to commit any new financial
support until ―substantial‖ progress on the political and economic reform agenda had
taken place. The lack of financial support affected the Kenyan government‘s
budgetary position immensely and led to an increased budget deficit. The
government resorted to domestic borrowing from the banking sector. Government
borrowing from domestic banks increased by 59 percent during the 1990-91 fiscal
year (GOK 1992, Budget Speech).

In the midst of all the political and economic pressure on Kenya for reform,
the IFIs added another conditionality: combating corruption. Addressing corruption
became a major focus of the IMF and the World Bank‘s engagement with Kenya
beginning in the 1990s, as corruption became a prominent concern, especially with
the revelation of the Goldenberg scandal.

The Goldenberg scandal, which is estimated to have cost Kenya $850
million, a fifth of the country‘s GDP, involved government officials, members of
President Moi‘s family, and billionaire Kamlesh Pattni. In 1990, in an effort to
revive the failing economy after the first Gulf War by encouraging exporters to
repatriate their hard currency earnings, the government promised a 20 percent
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interest rate on foreign currency deposited in Kenya‘s Central Bank. Presenting his
company, Goldenberg International, as a diamonds and gold export-processing
agency, and with the complicity of some officials at CBK, several commercial banks,
and the Ministry of Finance, Pattni manipulated the system and received a 35 percent
fee on payment made by the treasury for the export of minerals from 1990 to 1993. It
was discovered that the shipments never happened (Karanja 2003).

Once the scandal was made public, the IMF and other donors demanded an
investigation and implementation of anti-corruption programs in order for Kenya to
receive any financial assistance. The IMF notes that the ―case was noteworthy for its
size, the range of the channels used, its coincidence with the 1992 elections, and the
lack of conclusive legal follow-up‖ (IMF 2011). In 2000, the IMF and other
multilateral donors suspended the disbursement of $200 million in loans to Kenya
after the government backtracked on its commitment to fight corruption. One
interpretation of the government‘s failure to follow up with any serious investigation
was that it was not too concerned about the suspension of financial aid. That is, the
lack of investigation was an indication that financial aid was not a primary factor in
the government‘s approach to dealing with public corruption (Karanja 2003).

The IFIs‘ threat to withhold financial assistance to Kenya was nonetheless an
important signal to Kenya regarding its failure to combat corruption, and such a
signal helped to empower domestic actors who were agitating against public
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corruption and other government abuses dating back to 1982 after the constitutional
change to one-party rule. In defiance of the law against opposition political parties,
the reformists created the National Democratic Party (NDP), ―declaring that
multiparty democracy offered the only hope for an end to corruption, economic
mismanagement, and unaccountable government‖ (Barkan 1993:91). Civic
organizations including churches and professional associations also were demanding
reforms that included political transparency, political pluralism, and an end to public
corruption.

The first major political success of the internal actors‘ efforts toward
liberalization of the political system was the repeal in 1991 of the section of the
Constitution that had made KANU the only legal political party and provided for the
formation of other political parties. This change was one of the most important
features of political reform in Kenya since independence and paved the way for the
first multi-party parliamentary and presidential elections under the new system in
December 1992 (Kanyinga 2007). The second political victory was acknowledgment
that public-sector corruption needed to be arrested. Opposition politicians and civic
organizations, supported by the then highly constrained media, spent years criticizing
the record of the Moi government on economic regulation, calling for purposeful
reforms. By the late 1990s, Kenya‘s Parliament had passed a number of laws to
address public corruption. But by the time the IMF threatened, once again, to cancel
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a $22 million loan package in 1996 if Kenya did not address corruption, domestic
groups had already forced the issue onto the national agenda (Jarso 2010; Ponce
1998).

The efforts of the domestic actors, with the support of pressure from external
actors, were very successful. Their major success was political pluralism. In Kenya‘s
first contested, multi-party election in 1992, President Moi was reelected but only
with a plurality of the vote. He won the presidential election because the opposition
was split along tribal lines and unable to unite behind one candidate. Amutabi (2009)
noted that ―many observers of Kenya‘s political scene believe that it was the Kikuyu
factor that destroyed the opposition unity in 1992 allowing KANU to win the
election‖ (64-5).

Two years after the first multiparty election, a new alliance, the United
National Democratic Alliance, was formed. As the next multiparty elections
approached in 1997, the new alliance once again splintered along ethnic lines. This
split—which first happened with the political parties in the mid-1950s and
reoccurred in 1992 1997—highlighted the central role of ethnicity in Kenyan
politics. Moi won reelection again in 1997 because of the ethnic division and his
ability to successfully co-opt the opposition‘s message. When the opposition parties
threatened to boycott the elections unless their demands for reforms were met,
President Moi pressed the Parliament to pass several of the reforms and promised to
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work on additional reform initiatives. Furthermore, he managed to defuse some of
their complaints in the summer of 1997 by agreeing to work on their demands. Moi
managed to stay in power for ten years after the first multiparty elections in 1992
(Amutabi 2009; Wanyande 2007).

3.6

Conclusion

Moi implemented policies that favored his Kalenjin ethnic community at the
expense of other ethnic communities. He behaved in ways similar to President
Kenyatta, including repression of political opponents. The policies and behavior
created resentment among the Kikuyu and Luo communities, but members of the
Kalenjin community and Moi justified the policies as redressing historical wrongs
done to them and other smaller ethnic groups during the Kenyatta presidency. For
the Kikuyu and Luo communities, replacing Moi became an imperative. When the
coup attempt against Moi in 1982 failed, they saw reform as their best strategy to
politically weaken him and eventually defeat him and his political party.

The ethnic rivalry, corruption in Harambee, and economic decline aligned
perfectly to create an environment where popular pressure served as the most
effective tool to force the government to concede to liberalization. Internal agitation
for reform reached a peak in the summer of 1990 as the government quelled popular
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protests, causing international actors to come to the aid of the reformers and support
their demands on the state. Pressure from the World Bank and IMF complemented
the internal pressures and strengthened the internal actors, which further constrained
Moi‘s space to maneuver. This dynamics between internal and external actors in
pushing the state toward liberalization played out in individual sectors of Kenya‘s
economy. The next two chapters present the agricultural and financial sectors,
respectively, and illustrate how the different actors – internal and external –
interacted to pressure the Moi government to concede to liberalization.
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CHAPTER FOUR
PRIVATIZATION AND LIBERALIZATION:
AGRICUTLURAL SECTOR REFORM IN KENYA

Scholars who have written about the spread of liberalization to the
developing world over the last 40 years have credited the World Bank and IMF as
the primary external actors driving this phenomenon. The consensus has been that
these external actors have been able to force developing countries to embrace
liberalization through conditionality. However, when examining the policy
recommendations and evaluation reports of the World Bank and IMF‘s programs, it
is obvious that oftentimes there were no metrics to measure progress; the institutions
had no way of identifying duplicate projects in countries‘ requests for assistance;
countries did not often adhere to the conditionality terms or implement the policy
recommendations; and countries also continued to receive financial aid when the
World Bank and IMF publicly said they would not provide assistance.

In the case of Kenya, the World Bank reported that it provided financial
assistance to Kenya to carry out some of the same agricultural reforms five times.
Easterly best made this argument and it is worth quoting at length:

There was no progress on economic reform indicators from one
adjustment loan to the next in the same country (Easterly, 2002; Van
de Walle, 2001). A common reason for aid to be given even after
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conditions are violated is that with high political instability, a new
government took power and was given a clean slate by the aid
agencies. But there are a number of cases where aid was given
repeatedly even to the same government in the same country. For
example, World Bank reports on Kenya repeated a recommendation
for increased funding for road maintenance in 1979, 1983, 1989,
1994, 1996, and 2000. A World Bank (1998) report noted that in
Kenya ―the World Bank provided aid to support identical agricultural
policy reforms five separate times.‖ Yet the IMF and World Bank
gave Kenya 21 adjustment loans during 1980-2000, all under the
same regime of President Daniel [a]rap Moi. President Moi of Kenya
got one conditional aid loan each from the World Bank and IMF in
the year 2000, despite his poor track record and the new emphasis on
selectivity (Easterly [No Year]:24).8

The lack of rigorous assessment of proposals, lack of metrics to evaluate
progress, and the lack of uniformity around reporting should temper the arguments
that conditionality terms from these institutions were the main force pushing the Moi
government toward liberalization. This chapter offers a different explanation,
focusing on internal actors instead of these external institutions for Kenya‘s
liberalizing reforms in the agricultural sector, a sector that generates nearly 20
percent of Kenya‘s gross domestic product, and on which more than 80 percent of
the population relies for its livelihood.

This chapter begins by explicating the various ways in which the state could
undertake privatization, a major pillar of liberalization. Liberalization in this sector
involved privatization of state-owned agricultural parastatals, marketing boards and
cooperatives and/or removing their monopoly powers so that private investors could
8

There is no date on the paper. It can be downloaded from:
http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/wgape/papers/3_Easterly.doc.
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enter the market. This section is followed by a discussion of the importance of the
agricultural sector in Kenya and how internal and external actors pressured the state
to concede to reform. The chapter then focuses on the liberalization of Kenya Cooperative Creameries and the dairy market and highlights similar reforms in other
agricultural market boards. The last section describes how pressure from a coalition
of small-scale farmers and business groups and deteriorating economic conditions
contributed to reforming public subsidy programs to farmers.

4.1

Forms of Privatization
Strictly defined, ―privatization is the transfer of public sector assets and

activities to the private sector‖ (Nyong'o 2000:2). Here, privatization refers to
―policies aimed at transferring full or partial ownership and control of public
enterprises to the private sector to encourage competition and emphasize the role of
market forces in place of statutory restrictions and monopoly power‖ (Ngugi
2000:83). There are three broad forms of privatization: full or partial ownership,
management, and decontrol or de-monopolization. The sale or transfer of stateowned companies could be affected through competitive bidding, divestiture,
liquidation, or management buyout.
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Full or partial ownership means that the government may sell a state-owned
company to private investors outright or sell shares of the company through a
process of competitive bidding. The bid is open to a number of potential investors
who then compete to buy the shares. This method provides the state with the best
opportunity to get the best deal. Competitive bidding can be the best way to assuage
concerns over corruption and nepotism (Ngugi 2000).

The Moi government did not use this method because, it was assumed, few if
any in the Kalenjin community had the financial resources or technical know-how
necessary to make such investments. The best a Kalenjin could do in terms of largescale investment was to partner with the existing international corporations in Kenya
or domestic firms at the time. Such partnerships in Kenya were never secure,
however, because such partnerships changed when the political environment in the
country changed, along ethnic lines (Himbara 1994).

The government may also privatize a public company through divestiture by
floating shares of the company through a formal capital market where individual
investors can buy them. Among the advantages of this method is that it allows broad
ownership, meaning more people in the public have the potential to purchase shares
in the company provided the share price is affordable. The country, however, has to
have a capital market, which Kenya had, and the company has to be considered
viable to investors. Divestiture, according to Ngugi (2000), signals the ―strongest
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form of private sector commitment‖ (95). This method has many challenges,
particularly its susceptibility to political pressure from lawmakers, current
employees, and interest groups. It also requires high level of expertise in valuation,
pricing, and all the ―formalities in preparation of prospectus‖ and other application
forms (ibid.).

The Moi government first used it in 1988 and 1990 for partial divestiture
from the Commercial Bank of Kenya. The timing of these two rounds of
privatization corresponded with the intense domestic pressure on the government to
reform, a move that happened three years before the Kenyan government sought
assistance from the IFIs for its parastatal Reform Program. The government reduced
its ownership of Kenya Commercial Bank by 40 percent at the time of these
transactions (Bank 2001).

The government was responding to public pressure regarding corruption. By
spending resources and time to ensure that the valuation and pricing of parastatal
privatization was done correctly, President Moi sought to calm popular calls for
transparency, and hoped to reduce the political pressure on his government.
Makonnen (2001) explains this same point:
In fact, considerable time and resources were devoted to valuations; and
price was the single most important determinant in selecting investors
in most cases. Selecting a bidder who offers the highest price renders it
easier to convince observers that the process is transparent and thus
provides political protection (5).
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The management buyout method involves selling the company to existing
employees who are able to secure financing through banks. Employees and managers
become owners. A disadvantage of this method is that it is often used when the
company is not able to go public through capital markets for a number of reasons,
including uncertainty regarding its value. While the public may be uncertain about
the value of the company, management may have an idea of how new infusion of
capital can give it leverage. A disadvantage of this method is that it increases the
likelihood that the company will be undervalued. The government may also decide to
maintain the company but privatize management through a management contract.
The issue of valuation remains but this method indicates that the government‘s
commitment to private sector participation is weak (Ngugi 2000).

Decontrol permits private businesses to enter the market to compete with or
complement state-owned businesses. Ngugi (2000) argues that in this case, ―if a
competitive strategy is adopted, then market pressure may help improve the
performance and commercial outlook of the public enterprise […]‖ (94). The
Kenyan government used the decontrol method to a considerable extent especially in
the agricultural sector as it did away with monopoly powers from several of the
marketing boards and authorities.
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4.2

Importance of the Agricultural Sector and Pressure to Reform

Eighty percent of Kenya‘s land is arid or semi-arid where many of Kenya‘s
pastoral and nomadic tribes live and/or rotate throughout different seasons. They
account for 20 percent of the population and own half of Kenya‘s livestock. The
importance of agriculture makes arable land a high-value asset, and a sensitive issue
among the various tribal groups (Alila and Atieno 2006). Arable land is defined
based on the amount of rainfall received per year. The land is ranked as high,
medium, or low potential. An area is classified as high potential agricultural land if it
gets at least 857 mm of rain per year. The land is classified as medium potential if it
gets between 735 and 857.5 mm of year per year; and low potential receives 612.5
mm or less of rainfall per year (Obara 2000).

Of Kenya‘s 44.6 million hectare area, only 8.6 million hectares are ranked as
medium- to high-potential agricultural land. Of those 8.6 million hectares, 60%
percent (5.2 million hectares) is allocated to crop and milk production. Milk
production alone accounts for 47 percent of the 5.2 million hectares used for farming
and maize, wheat, tea and coffee production for over 25 percent of this farmland
(Kenya 1988). Given the importance of the dairy and cereal industries, these subsectors are the focus of this chapter.
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Table 5: Agricultural Land in Kenya (‗000 ha; Population in ‗000)
Region

Med.
Potential
15

Low
Potential
41

Other
Land
353

Total
Area
1,318

Population

Central

High
Potential
909

Coast

373

796

5,663

1,472

8,304

2,623

Eastern

503

2,189

11,453

1,431

15,576

4,841

Nairobi

16

-

38

14

68

2,290

N. Eastern

-

-

12,690

-

12,690

1,055

Nyanza

1,218

34

-

-

1,252

4,598

Rift Valley

3,025

123

12,230

1,515

16,883

7,386

Western

741

-

-

82

823

3,532

6,785

3,157

42,115

4,867

56,914

30,207

3,882

Source: (Nyangito, Nzuma, Ommeh, and Mbithi 2004:14)

The regions with the largest portion of land in the high potential area are the
Rift Valley (3,025 ha), Nyanza (1,218 ha) and the Central (909 ha) and Western (741
ha) Provinces. About 3.2 million hectares of the land were subdivided into smaller
holdings averaging 1.2 hectares per individual. Larger holdings of about 780 million
hectares were subdivided into individual ownership of 3,600 owners. Kenya‘s
postcolonial agricultural policy was based on these factors of land divisions,
availability of graded agricultural land, and the land tenure systems – customary and
(statutory) privatized – with all of their historical legacies described in chapter two.
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The pastoralist and nomadic tribes who lived in the arid and semi arid regions
were marginalized by the Kenyatta government because they were associated
KADU, the opposition party after independence. When Moi came to power he
initiated a program to benefit them. President Moi had to develop programs quickly
because his KADU constituencies saw his rise to the presidency as their turn to
benefit from state largesse, as it was the case for Kikuyu under President Kenyatta.
The program focused on ways to improve breeding of sheep and goats, and on
developing and improving stock routes and water supplies. The World Bank
supported the initial program with a $4 million loan. These ethnic groups, who had
been marginalized, began to see tangible benefits from the state (Bank 1981).

The World Bank noted the shift in policy and program focus in 1981,
referring to what the Moi government proposed to do in its first development plan
(1979-1983), ―in addition to projects to increase larger scale commercial and
smallholder production, a series of integrated rural development projects in semi-arid
areas is proposed to redress the neglect of these areas‖ (Bank 1979; Bank 1981:5).
Just as in any political system, constituents approve of their politicians who bring
development projects to their communities. The new program helped broaden
President Moi‘s coalition, secure his power, and set the tone (of adherence to ethnic
politics) for his entire presidency.
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4.3

IFI Support and Reform

Both the World Bank and IMF provided financial assistance to Kenya under
President Moi to reform the agricultural sector, including the agricultural marketing
boards and parastatals. From 1980 to 1989, the World Bank disbursed 13 financial
assistance packages to Kenya for agricultural sector development and liberalization.
One of the state-controlled boards that the World Bank and IMF wanted liberalized
was the National Cereals and Produce Board (NCPB). This request was first made in
1982 as part of a US$13.2 million agricultural institutional development credit
package to Kenya. The government did not reform the NCPB during the period of
the credit, however. Reforming the NCPB remained a condition of the IFIs all
throughout the 1980s and 1990s (ADBG 2001). The World Bank and IMF
complained about the failure of the government to reform the NCPB, but they
continued to provide financial aid and technical assistance to the sector. This was an
example where the government failed to adhere to a specific conditionality without
suffering any significant adverse consequences

While President Moi was exerting more control in the sector in order to
consolidate his power and distribute largesse to his supporters, his government
continued to receive substantial agricultural sector development loans and credits
from the IFIs, as Table 6 below shows. [See Appendix C for an extended list of the
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World Bank‘s operations in Kenya‘s agricultural sector]. Despite these loans and
demands for reform from the IFIs, the sector remained highly controlled by the state,
with marketing boards implementing regulations, setting prices, and providing
subsidies.

Table 6: The World Bank‘s Agricultural Loans and Credit to Kenya 1981-1988
Appraisal
Year
1981
1982
1983
1986
1988

Loan (L) or
Credit (C)
L1995/C1443
C1237
C1277
C1387
C1717/AFO21
C1718
C1974

Disbursement
($ million)
35.0
21.6
6.0
14.5
60.0
13.2
21.9
Total: 172.2

Disbursement
Approval (percent)
100
98
100
97
100
115
105

Source: (Bank 1998:7)9

The IFIs were informed about the lack of progress toward reform. In fact, in
1981, the World Bank noted a series of problems contributing to the ineffectiveness
of its previous loans to Kenya and yet proceeded with a new $35 million loan/credit
package to the government, the fourth loan/credit to the Agricultural Finance
Corporation (AFC), one of two primary agricultural lending institutions in Kenya
(the other was the Cooperative Bank of Kenya). The Project Performance Audit
9

These loans were selected based on the percentage of disbursement (at least 97 percent), indicating
that the World Bank had accepted Kenya‘s progress reports to release virtually all of the funds.
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Report and Project Impact Evaluation Report of the first loan/credit concluded that
the projects supported by the financial package ―probably had only a marginal
economic impact at the farm level and possibly even a slightly negative financial
impact on AFC‖ (Bank 1981:14). While the AFC made some improvement on the
second and third financial packages, lack of staff capacity and program coordination
remained major problems.

The first round (1980-1990) of IFI pressure on Kenya to reform the sector
failed to produce the intended outcomes of privatizing or dismantling the marketing
boards and opening up the market for private investors to compete. By 1990, the
domestic political environment had begun to deteriorate, with increasing resistance
against the Moi government, and Kikuyu and Luo farmers leaving formal
government structures in protest. In order to relieve some of the pressures from the
farmers and their allies, Kenya adopted a new agricultural reform program known as
the Second Agricultural Adjustment Operation (ASAO II). ASAO II was to start in
1992 and be completed in 1998. As will be explained below, this period was the
most successful for reform in the sector. That timeframe corresponded with the
periods from 1990-1995 and 1997-1999 during which the IFIs had suspended
financial assistance to Kenya (Njehu 2003). The fact that reforms happened at a time
when the World Bank and IMF had suspended their aid weakens the argument that
these actors were the main forces behind reform in the sector.
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4.4

Role and Functions of Marketing Boards and Cooperatives

The colonial government allocated land and set up government-dominated
marketing boards and cooperatives to control agriculture. The marketing boards were
agencies empowered with legal authority over producers and purchasers of primary
and processed agricultural products. They were also the primary agencies that set and
controlled commodity prices. Marketing boards differed from co-operatives by their
legal status and power to compel compliance to their rules and regulations (Abbott
1967). Co-operatives could be established by either the government or independently
by producers. Either way, co-operatives served as the link between the producers and
boards. The boards were often the only purchaser of specified commodities in
domestic markets. The stated goals of marketing boards and cooperatives were to
promote economic development by providing necessary services to agricultural
producers, services such as fertilizer, better seeds, information, and greater access to
markets, and protection from unfair international competition (Abbott 1967;
Nyangito 2001; Wanyama 2009).

Due to lack of data, it is not clear how many boards Kenya had at
independence, but by 1982, there were 108 boards regulating and setting prices in all
sectors of the economy (Cohen 1993). In addition to their regulatory duties, they had
the capacity to pay less to producers and sell for much higher prices to foreign and
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domestic markets. The management of these structures resulted in price controls,
inefficient subsidy programs, and overall mismanagement. After independence, these
structures and the way in which they were managed were passed on to the Kenyan
leaders. President Kenyatta took advantage of them to favor his ethnic Kikuyu
community, and President Moi did the same in favor of his Kalenjin community
(Kanyinga 1994; Holmquist et al. 1994).

The political influence of the government and mismanagement of these
structures led to protests against government intrusion in the agricultural sector,
which resulted in reform of many of the boards. The reforms included stripping the
boards of their monopoly powers, which meant allowing private actors to enter
commodities markets to compete. Removing their monopoly powers also meant
curbing the boards‘ authority to place controls on producers and buyers.

Each of the major primary agricultural commodities had a marketing board.
The Dairy Board of Kenya (DBK) and the Kenya Cooperative Creameries regulated
the dairy market; the Kenya Tea Board (KTB) and the Kenya Tea Development
Authority (KTDA) were responsible for the tea market; and the National Cereals and
Produce Board (NCPB) regulated the wheat and other cereals markets. The
government was heavily involved in running these boards, ranging from appointing
managing directors to setting up prices that cooperatives had to pay to producers
(Burgess 1997).
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One of President Moi‘s interventions to control prices was to reduce prices
paid to Kikuyu farmers for coffee and tea sold to the Kenya Tea Development
Authority. It had been accepted practice that the better quality tea and coffee
produced primarily in the Kikuyu-dominated Central Province would receive a
higher price than the lower quality production from the Kalenjin-dominated Rift
Valley. The Moi government also increased its control over the KTDA and replaced
many management officials with Kalenjins. In addition, President Moi created
Nyayo Tea Zones, which expanded areas of production for mostly Kalenjin farmers.
All of these efforts were part of his strategy to replace Kikuyu dominance in the
sector with that of Kalenjin and other ethnic groups (Grosh 1994). According to
Burgess:

[President Moi] began to dismantle the ruling coalition that centered on the
Kikuyu farming community. This coalition had been strongly committed to
agricultural growth first and redistribution second. In its place, Moi favored a
coalition based on his Kalenjin ethnic group and previously marginal groups.
The new coalition favored redistribution from Kikuyu farmers and supported
lower food prices after the urban revolt and coup attempt of 1982 (1997:141).

Critics of government intervention in markets through the mechanisms of
marketing boards, cooperatives, and price controls argued that such intervention
distorted markets, deprived producers of the actual price for their products, and
increased prices for consumers. They also argued that farmer representatives who
were appointed and sat on those boards were easily co-opted by management. Critics
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pointed to President Moi‘s appointment of one of his nephews as Managing Director
of the KTDA. He was not appointed because of his expertise in farming or
commodities markets, but rather because of his relationship to Moi. Critics also
noted his previous employment as the head of Kenya‘s Central Bank, a position for
which he was not qualified either. The appointment of President Moi‘s nephew to
head public institutions was the ultimate sign of nepotism in government and
reinforced the complaints that people were making about public corruption (Gitau et
al. 2008; Grosh 1994).

4.5

Kenya Cooperative Creameries and Dairy Market

The liberalization of Kenya‘s dairy market beginning in 1992 was a good
example of how internal dynamics influenced reform. The dairy industry, dominated
by small-scale farmers‘ herds produced 70 percent of total annual milk in Kenya.
The dairy industry accounted for 14 percent of the agricultural GDP and 3.5 percent
of the total GDP (Atieno and Kanyinga 2008). Prior to 1992, Kenya‘s dairy farmers
had three major problems with the overregulated dairy market and the way in which
the Moi government controlled the Kenya Creameries Cooperative (KCC).

The farmers‘ first problem concerned government controls and regulations.
They did not have choices in terms of market outlets to sell their products, which
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meant they could not tell if they were getting accurate prices for what they sold. The
key actors in the market were smallholder farmers who typically owned one to two
milking cows; the government, through the Ministry of Cooperative Development
(MoDC) and the Kenya Creameries Cooperative (KCC); and the dairy farmer
cooperative societies (DFCSs). The DFCSs were made up of smallholder producers
and prior to liberalization were required to register with the (MoDC). Once
registered, the MoDC was responsible for the supervision of cooperatives‘ elections
and financial accounts. MoDC also became responsible for approving capital
expenditures and policies (Atieno and Kanyinga 2008).

With such control over the registered DFCSs, MoDC‘s decisions were more
often politically motivated than supervisory in the interests of smallholder producers.
In addition to supervisory rules and regulations from MoDC, the DFCSs also had to
directly engage the KCC, an agency that was supposedly made up of farmer
representatives and government officials to regulate market-related issues such as
prices and services to farmers. The KCC was the primary market outlet for dairy
cooperatives and the main processor and purchaser of milk. It was also the only
retailer of milk products in Kenya‘s urban areas (Burgess 1997; Owango et al. 1998).

The second problem revolved around government appointment of board
members to the KCC. The government appointed members not because of their
qualifications in livestock, dairy, or farming issues but rather for political reasons:
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While cooperative societies had a role in the appointment of directors,
influential politicians neglected this and instead appointed those they
thought were politically loyal to the government. At one time, those in
the board of directors included the then President‘s family members
and political allies. Appointment to the board was not based on
someone‘s knowledge of dairy or cooperative issues. It was based on
how close one was to the ruling elite. Those appointed, therefore,
used their positions not to better the KCC but to acquire individual
wealth. Their aim was to use their positions to make personal
financial gains through supplying goods and services (Otieno and
Kanyinga 2008:13).

The third problem that dairy farmers had with the KCC concerned delayed
payments. After selling their milk to the KCC, the DFCSs often went for months
without payment, which in turn meant they could not pay the farmers on time. To
avoid these problems, farmers left the formal cooperatives to create less formalized
self-help groups (SHGs) to collect and market milk. One of the main advantages of
these groups was that they could register with the Ministry of Culture and Social
Services instead of the MoDC. As a result of registering with the Ministry of Culture
and Social Services, the SHGs had few regulatory restrictions on their activities
(Otieno and Kanyinga 2008).

As the government exerted more control over the KCC and the Kenya Dairy
Board (KDB), more farmers left the formalized agencies to establish independent
farmer-led cooperatives and unions. In 1990, smallholder farmers in the Central
Province left the state-controlled cooperatives to form independent cooperatives and
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unions. Farmers in the Kiambu and Murang‘a Districts established four independent
cooperatives and unions. Smallholder farmers in Nyanza Province also began to
bypass the formal state-controlled structures to seek agricultural assistance and
services and free themselves from the state‘s constraints. Among the Nyanza
Province farmers were the Uriri Farmers‘ Cooperative Society and Mugama
Farmers‘ Cooperative. The flight of farmers from the KCC resulted in a budget crisis
for the agency, as the amount of fees collected from farmers declined (Owango,
Lukuyu, Staal, Kenyanjui, Njubi, and Thorpe 1998; Wanyama 2009).

4.6

Reformed KCC and Dairy Market and other Agricultural Boards

The farmers‘ message around government inefficiency and corruption with
respect to managing these agencies fed into larger campaigns at the national level in
1990 against the Moi government. Farmers and business groups sought to encourage
the development of private dairy processors to create a more competitive dairy
market that could raise producer prices. Before liberalization, when the KCC had
legal monopoly over the purchase and sales of milk, the KCC was handling 90
percent of all marketed processed milk in urban centers, and was also the major
buyer at the farm level. In contrast, non-KCC dairies were processing only five
percent of all reported marketed milk in urban centers (Staal and Shapiro 1994).
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In 1992, after pressure from farmers, including pressure brought about by
their leaving of the formal board structures, the government lifted the monopoly
powers of the KCC and restrictions on the dairy market. The government removed
its subsidies to the KCC and encouraged market-based services to farmers. As a
result of these reforms, more private milk processors and retailers entered the dairy
market. The number of smallholders in farmer-led cooperative societies increased
significantly in many districts in just a few years after the reforms (Owango et al.
1998). Table 7 below shows the increases in the numbers of active cooperative
society members from 1990 to 1995 and the increase in the percentage of private
milk purchaser outlets that entered the market after liberalization of the sector.

Table 7: Registered Active Membership of Dairy Farmers in Cooperative Societies
and Milk Sales by Dairy Farmer Cooperative to Different Market Outlets in 1990
and 1995, as mean percent by District
Kiambu
1990
1995
Registered Membership 33,410 40,491
Market Outlets (% of
1990
1995
DFCS milk purchased) (%)
(%)
KCC
49
24
Retail
29
49
Source: (Owango et al. 1998:176 and 179)

Murang’a
1990
1995
14,400 33,479
1990
1995
(%)
(%)
71
72
29
27

Thika
1990
7,618
1990
(%)
92
8

1995
9,781
1995
(%)
48
48

While there may be a number of factors that contributed to the increase in
membership in the farmers‘ cooperatives, the reforms were definitely one of them.
As noted on Table 7 above, these three districts saw significant increases in
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registered membership in cooperatives. Murang‘a saw the largest increase, more than
doubling its membership in five years, going from 14,400 registered members in
1990 to 33,479. More milk retailers entered the market, which gave dairy farmers
more choices in terms of market outlets to sell their milk. The KCC had to increase
its price paid to DFCSs in an effort to maintain or increase its supply and be
competitive (Staal and Shapiro 1994; Owango et al. 1998).

In Thika, before liberalization, 92 percent of DFCS‘s milk was sold to the
KCC and eight percent to other retail outlets. After liberalization made it legal for
other retailers to enter the milk-buying and processing market, only 48 percent of
Thika‘s DFCS‘s milk was sold to the KCC while other retail outlets saw their share
increase from eight percent to 48 percent during the same period of 1990-1995. A
major shift also took place in Kiambu during this period. DFCSs in Murang‘a did not
shift their preference from the KCC to other retailers and it was not clear why.
Overall, the availability of more choices of market outlets translated into significant
reduction in the percentage of milk that DFCS farmers sold to the KCC and increase
to the retailers since the reforms in 1992, as indicated in the table.

Prices that DFCSs paid to their farmers also increased because milk prices
increased in different markets after the reform. From 1990 to 1995, the average per
liter prices paid by the DFCS to their members rose from approximately Kenyan
Shillings (Ksh) 3 to 13, 11.50 and 11 in Kiambu, Murang‘a and Thika, respectively
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(Owango et al. 1998:181). The loss of government subsidies and farmers‘ fees put
considerable pressure on the KCC. As a result, the agency became severely indebted.
It collapsed in 1998 and its assets were sold to private investors, many of whom were
politicians or had political influence.10 After 1992, when the political system was
liberalized, farmers pressed legislators for reform of other inefficient and corrupt
marketing boards.

Just as more investors joined the dairy market when the government was
forced to lift KCC‘s monopoly powers so too was the case with the grains market
when the government lifted the monopoly power of the Kenya Planters‘ Cooperative
Union (KPCU) in 1993. Similar to other boards, the KPCU reforms included
deregulating markets and prices, removing various restrictions on foreign exchange,
and liberalizing interest rates (Nyangito 2001).

Before 1993, the KPCU was responsible for all coffee milling. The agency
was highly bureaucratic and inefficient as a result of rent-seeking activities. A
coalition of farmers and business groups led a series of public education campaigns
to press lawmakers to push for reform. Their efforts aimed at lifting the monopoly
status of the KPCU, reducing the myriad bureaucratic procedures, eliminating rentseeking opportunities, and giving farmers more freedom in the market place. The
10

The (post-Moi) Kibaki government repurchased the KCC in 2003, reorganized it, and it is once
again a government agency. Some of the same complaints around ethnic favoritism are again being
raised.
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public education efforts were successful in forcing the government to reform the
KPCU. As a result of deregulating the coffee market and lifting the monopoly power
of the KPCU, two new millers – Thika Coffee Miller and Scofina Miller – were
licensed by the government to enter the market (Gitau, Kimenju, Kibaara, Nyoro,
Bruntrup, and Zimmermann 2009).

Significant reforms were also made in the National Cereals and Produce
Board (NCPB). The government reduced its involvement in management and gave
farmers greater control. Reforming the NCPB was a demand of small farmers who
had argued that it was monopolistic and inefficient during the Moi presidency. They
often would not receive payment for their crop until months or even a year after the
sale (L. Kirimi, personal communication, August 10, 2010).

By the end of 1992 the government also reformed the tea factories by
eliminating the monopoly powers of the Kenya Tea Development Authority
(KTDA). By 1998, the KTDA had become a management company, and each tea
factory had become an independent company. As to the remaining assets of the
Authority, 50 percent was retained by the new KTDA, 25 percent was divided evenly
among the then 45 tea factory companies and the remaining 25 percent was
distributed among the companies in accordance with the proportion of management
fees that they had paid to the old KTDA between 1983 and 1998 (Van Buren 2008).
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The Agency managed 65 tea factories, and the large tea plantations organized
into Kenya Tea Growers‘ Association, which covers about 31,017 hectares.
However, smallholders produced over 60 percent of tea production and the subsector accounts for 20 percent of Kenya‘s foreign exchange earnings (Ochieng
2006). In addition to reforming these institutions, Kenya carried out reforms in many
other sub-sectors. Table 8 below lists some of the reforms.

Many scholars and observers of Kenyan politics have offered alternate
explanation, which credited aid suspension for the reforms in Kenya. The suspension
of financial aid to Kenya may have played a role in pressuring the government to
consider the reforms. However, if the suspension of aid did play a role, it was minor,
considering the IFIs‘ past history of aid suspension to Kenya. For example, in 1982,
the IMF/World Bank cancelled two loans totaling more than SDR 286 million
because the Moi government was not adhering to the terms of the loans. These
cancellations did not result in agricultural reform. The following year, 1983, the IFIs
provided Kenya with a stand-by loan SDR 175.9 million, and they went on to
disburse four additional loans to Kenya between 1985 and 1989, totaling SDR 367.1
(O'Brien and Ryan 2001). Both, aid suspension and enticement did not lead to
reform in the 1980s. The key difference between the 1980s and 1990s was the level
of internal agitation against the Moi government for reform.
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Table 8: Selected Reforms in Agricultural Sector, 1992-1994
Commodity
Coffee/Tea

Policy Before Change
 Auction marketing by boards
 Exporters cannot have foreign currency

Change
Year

After Change
 Foreign currency allowed

1992

Maize

 NCPB as the only importer with controls
on producer prices
 NCPB maintained strategic grains
reserves

 Private importers allowed but variable duty imposed
 Minimum price floor is set based on NCPB prices

Milk/Dairy
products

 Price controls
 KCC had monopoly in processing
marketing
 Kenya Dairy Board had monopoly over
imports
 Price controls
 Restrictions on domestic marketing and
trade

 Decontrolled prices
 Liberalized entry for private sector investors in
processing and marketing

 Controls on producer prices and imports

 Minimum prices and new tariffs set to protect
domestic producers

Cotton

Sugar

 Complete deregulation of domestic
marketing/pricing

1994
 NCPB as only importer
 Producer price controls
Source: (Nyangito, Nzuma, Ommeh, and Mbithi 2004:38).

 Minimum (floor) prices set based on long-term
import parity prices and imports controls

Wheat
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The liberalization of Kenya‘s agricultural sector supported some of the
arguments that proponents of liberalization have made with respect to increased
competition, efficiency, and pricing. Producers who, prior to liberalization, had to
sell their products to cooperatives, which then sold them to government agencies that
in turn sold them at an auction for export and domestic retail found the process much
simpler. Under the pre-liberalization system, many of the producers received their
payments in installments, and the final price they received was based on the average
price for the season. After 1992, when most of the agricultural sub-sectors (milk,
coffee, and tea) were liberalized and the pricing system was changed, more private
investors entered the different markets resulting in increased competition and
producers receiving one payment that reflected the actual price of their products
(Nyangito et al. 2004).

4.7

Ending Subsidies to Farmers

Farmers and business groups sought the elimination of subsidies as part of
the broader movement to address public corruption. They argued that the subsidies
were inefficient and consistently failed to reach their goals. The failure of subsidy
programs was illustrated in the milk (dairy) sub-sector. Smallholder herds produced
60 percent of milk in Kenya. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the government put
in place a broad program of artificial insemination (AI) carried out by the Kenya
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National Artificial Insemination Service (KNAIS). The program achieved 548,000
inseminations in 1979 at an average cost to the government of KSh 130 per
pregnancy, though the cost ranged from KSh 30 to KSh 1,300. The farmer, on the
other hand, was paying as little as KSh 1 to 2.20 per insemination. Despite the high
level of government subsidy, inseminations dropped by 20 percent every year from
1980 to 1985, proving government critics correct that subsidies were not effective.
The cost to the government was projected to substantially increase by 2000, from
Kenyan pound (K£) 1.7 million to K£4.5 million (Kenya 1988:73).

The economic crisis that Kenya was experiencing and public pressure forced
the government, in 1985, to make dairy farmers pay more for artificial insemination
services. The government reduced its subsidies and argued for cost sharing with
farmers. The idea of greater cost sharing has evolved in the post-1992 period but the
same principle of reducing government subsidies has remained (Kenya 1988). A
study conducted in the first few years after liberalization of the sub-sector and
reduction of government subsidies showed that farmers‘ access to artificial
insemination increased significantly in the districts studied. In Kiambu, the number
of active dairy cooperative farmers with access to artificial insemination service went
from 3,500 in 1990 to 14,863 in 1995. In the Murang‘a District, the number went
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from zero to 10,276; and in the Thika District, it went from zero to 1,690. These
increases in the number of farmers with access to greater services were the result of
more private service providers entering the market after liberalization (Owango et al.
1998:177).

In 1996, the government argued that it needed to reduce subsidies provided to
farmers as a way to reduce public expenditure and better manage public resources.
The government even sought to recover some subsidies by imposing user-fees or
what it called ―cost-recovery‖ fees in some cases. Critics of the IFIs argued that the
―user-fee‖ came from the World Bank and the IMF. The critics may be partly
correct, but government documents written in the late 1970s and early1980s (19791983 Development Plan) showed that Kenya was using terms that were analogous to
―user-fee.‖ Also, Kenya‘s Sessional Paper No.1 of 1986 used ―participant support‖
to help finance the recurrent costs of government services. Sessional Paper No.1 also
noted: ―Government has long charged fees for certain services‖ (Kenya 1988:29). In
1997, the term ―cost-recovery‖ was used. As Kenya‘s 1997-2001 Development Plan
put it:

[T]he Government is rationalizing public expenditure through the
evolution of better public financial resources management. Where
feasible, gradual cost-recovery on all market-oriented public services
has been imposed. Furthermore, only core public project are being
fully funded (1997:47).
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The various reforms that took place were beneficial to farmers but it does not
mean that all farmers enjoyed the benefits or that there were not unintended
consequences. In the coffee subsector, for example, after the liberalization of the
foreign exchange market, cooperative societies were paid in foreign currency by the
Coffee Board of Kenya and were allowed to maintain foreign exchange accounts.
However, as Hezron (2001) points out, most small-scale farmers were paid through
their cooperatives in local currency, which meant they did not ―directly benefit from
payments in foreign exchange for coffee exports‖ (15). While liberalization helped to
remove implicit government controls induced taxes on coffee earnings, ―farmers still
complain[ed] about the prices they receive[d] possibly because of high deductions
made by societies and ineffective management of the societies and factories‖
(Hezron 2001:15).

Another group of farmers who did not benefit or were possibly adversely
affected by liberalization were those in remote areas. Before liberalization, the
government subsidized the transportation costs of their product, but with the end of
subsidies, these farmers were less likely to be able to reach markets in urban centers
or those who managed to make it received a lower price for their milk due to the
increase in their transportation costs (Owango et al. 1998).
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4.8

Conclusion

Kenya undertook the reforms that this chapter highlighted because of
pressures from the domestic actors who were fed up with inefficient and repressive
government policies. External actors helped the process either by providing support
or by withholding support to the government. The chapter explained the importance
of the agricultural sector to Kenya‘s economy and society, an importance that all of
the actors recognized, making reforming even more urgent. Small-scale farmers took
an active role in the reform movement and their reform campaigns intersected with
national campaigns against the Moi government creating a broad coalition for change
in Kenya.

Among the most important of the reforms in the agricultural sector was the
striping of the government-controlled cooperatives and marketing boards of their
monopoly powers, which paved the way for new and private investors to enter the
market. Reforming the Kenya Creameries Cooperative and opening the diary market
to competition resulted in increased membership in farmers‘ cooperatives and
increased prices for dairy farmers. In the reform efforts, the IMF and World Bank
provided significant financial support to the sector but, as the chapter noted, it was
not their financial support that drove the reform process and its success. The chapter
provided evidence – dates of the loans, amount of the loans, and program
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performance reports - showing the government lack of compliance with the World
Bank/IMF‘s conditionality terms, which frustrated the donor institutions.

Growing frustration among small-scale farmers and business groups about
government inefficiency and corruption led them to agitate against the government
and demand reform. Their demands coincided with the then-developing narrative of
government corruption, which increased pressure on the government for reform. As
more farmers refrained from participating in the government controlled marketing
boards and cooperatives, these agencies faced deep financial crises and the
government conceded to reforming them. The government faced a similar situation
with respect to the financial sector, an evaluation of which is presented in the next
chapter.
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CHAPTER FIVE
PRIVATIZATION AND LIBERALIZATION:
FINANCIAL SECTOR REFORM IN KENYA

Based on the explanations of the different forms of privatization discussed in
the previous chapter, this chapter on financial sector reforms similarly explores the
role of internal actors and factors and external actors in reducing state involvement in
the economy through lifting controls on foreign exchange and investors, and through
privatization of (divestiture from) state-owned banks and non-banks financial
institutions (NBFIs).

Despite receiving substantial amount of financial assistance from the IMF
and World Bank for more than two decades to undertake reforms, Kenya neglected
the institutions‘ major policy recommendations with no apparent trepidation about
the threats of aid suspension. The IMF has acknowledged that under the Moi
presidency Kenya did not implement its policy advice. In an evaluation report
written in 2004, the IMF said, [b]efore 2003, ―pervasive governance problems and
weak political commitment to economic reforms did not provide a favorable
environment for the implementation of Fund policy advice‖ (IMF 2009:5).11 Despite
11The Moi presidency ended at the end of 2002. The report was referring to the IMF’s

challenging history with the Moi government and assessing the prospects for better engagement
with the Kibaki government, which came to office in January 2003.
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the lack of implementation of IMF policy recommendations and the perceived ―weak
political commitment to economic reforms,‖ Kenya did carry out a number of
economic and political reforms persistently demanded by internal agitators.

This chapter explores the weakness of the threats of aid suspension, and even
actual aid suspension, and suggests that conditionality around financial aid assistance
cannot be said to have been the main factor pushing the Moi government toward
liberalization of the financial sector.

The chapter starts by explaining how the state became involved in the
financial sector and how the state‘s role shifted from what some have called ―a
benevolent guiding hand‖ to less involvement (Mwale 2000:59). This shift was
indicated by the privatization of state-owned parastatals and lifting of restrictions on
private entrepreneurs‘ entrance to the market. After this explanation of the shifting
role of the state in the sector, the discussions focus on three areas that illustrate the
primacy of internal pressure in forcing President Moi to reform the financial sector
by reducing the role of the state: (1) the state preference for domestic businesses by
imposing controls on foreign investors and the subsequent lifting of restrictions as a
result of popular pressure, (2) privatization of state-owned financial institutions and
parastatals, and (3) development of policies to address public corruption.
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5.1

Shifting Role of the State in the Financial Sector

The government took a trusteeship, or a guiding role in the financial sector,
soon after independence, a role that the government explained in its Sessional Paper
No.10 of 1965. Three important points related to the financial sector can be
extrapolated from the Sessional Paper: (1) Kenya welcomed foreign investors as long
as they were willing to allow Kenyans to own shares in their businesses and be hired
in management positions, (2) Kenya intended to pursue a very selective
nationalization, including buying minority shares or taking full control of businesses
that were important to economic development, and (3) Kenya promised that stateowned businesses ―would be operated efficiently, covering their costs, and
contributing a profit‖ to the Treasury (Mwale 2000:62). These stipulations in the
Sessional Paper were followed by a number of government policies that targeted
specific businesses in which to buy majority or minority shares.

Initially there was widespread support for the state to be involved in the
economy through ownership of companies. State ownership was seen by the public
and the government as a way to support nascent national and local businesses. Some
influential political leaders at the time saw state ownership of companies as a way
for the state to have control over Kenya‘s resources for redistributive purposes. By
the end of the 1970s, the government owned equity shares in 250 businesses and was
a majority owner in more than 50 percent of them (Ikiara 2000:40).
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However, the trusteeship, or guiding role that the Kenyatta government took
in the financial sector, increasingly became viewed as favoring the Kikuyu business
community over other ethnic groups. ―Africanization in manufacturing and
commerce was seen as covertly favoring the Kikuyu in the late 1960s, and overtly so
in the first half of the 1970s‖ (Mwale 2000:81 [endnote 9]). By the mid-1970s, the
state became very controlling in the economy, leading to widespread complaints of
public corruption, ethnic nepotism, and institutional inefficiency. Institutional
inefficiency contradicted the third point of the Sessional Paper No.10 of 1965
requiring that state-owned businesses would be run so efficiently as to make a profit
greater than the foregone taxes the Treasury would have collected had they been
private companies.

Managing the companies—companies that eventually were not profitable, as
broadly predicted by proponents of liberalization—required significant public
resources. The increase in public sector expenditure to maintain the state-owned
businesses, as well as expansion of central and local government services, resulted in
a major increase in the public sector. The share of public sector employment, for
example, rose from 29 percent in 1963 to 39 percent in 1973, and was almost 50
percent in the early 1980s (Ikiara 2000:42). Critics of the Kenyatta government
pointed to ethnic imbalances in public-sector employment and support of local
businesses. President Moi continued the practice of state intervention in the economy
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through ownership of companies and he also practiced ethnic favoritism (Jonyo
2002; Himbara 1994).

5.2

Controls on Foreign Exchange and Investors and Favoring Domestic
Investors

One of the primary mechanisms of controls was the Exchange Control Act,
under which the Central Bank of Kenya was the sole agency with authority to
transact in foreign currency. The Central Bank licensed commercial banks to handle
foreign currencies on behalf of their clients. The commercial banks were required to
sell all foreign currencies to the Central Bank within a specified period. It was illegal
for individuals and/or firms to possess or trade in foreign currency without
permission from the Central Bank. All exports out of Kenya had to be declared and
foreign exchange earnings from such exports had to go through licensed commercial
banks to be converted to Kenyan shillings before they were transferred to the
exporters. Importers who needed foreign currencies to pay for imports or other
international obligations had to apply for import licenses from the Ministry of
Commerce and Industry. The application then had to be approved by the Central
Bank. The process could take months and even then, obtaining foreign currencies for
imports was not always assured because of the abuse and corruption in the import
licensing and foreign exchange allocation system (Warutere 2005; Central Bank of
Kenya: www.centralbank.go.ke).
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In addition to foreign exchange controls, the government imposed a series of
restrictions on foreign companies to discourage them from repatriating their profits.
The government reasoned that if the foreign companies were barred from repatriating
their profits they would instead invest more in Kenya. Foreign companies that did
not reinvest a high percentage of their profit in Kenya saw their borrowing rights
restricted by the government. As a penalty, the offending foreign companies‘
borrowing from commercial banks in Kenya was capped at 20 percent of their total
investment, while African firms were allowed to borrow up to 40 percent of their
total investment. It was argued that the restrictions on foreign companies and
preferential treatment toward Kenyan businesses were necessary to give the domestic
businesses access to capital to level the playing field with foreign-owned businesses
so that they could compete (Swainson 1977). Post-independence debates around
building domestic capital dominated Kenya‘s political scene. Observers of Kenyan
politics paid attention to the fact that Kikuyu businesses, which were becoming the
heart of the new Kenyan bourgeois, were the primary benefactors of these policies
and that members of the Kikuyu community were the ―leading industrial capitalists‖
in the 1970s (Himbara 1994:476).

The government also used the Trade Licensing Act and the Import-Export
and Essential Supplies Act to further restrict foreign investors while promoting
domestic businesses. The Trade Licensing Act proscribed non-Africans from trading
in non-central areas of business and from conducting business in rural areas. That is,
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non-citizens could conduct business only in Nairobi, Mombasa, and other major
cities and towns. The Act proved to be successful in shifting businesses from nonKenyans to Kenyans. For example, Kitale, a town in Western Kenya saw an 80
percent turnover of businesses from non-Kenyans to Kenyans from 1967 to 1969
(Muller 1981). The Import-Export and Essential Supplies Act gave the Kenya
National Trade Corporation (KNTC) monopoly power over wholesale and retail
commodities trading, which became the main agency responsible for assisting
Kenyans in all aspects of trading (Brownbridge and Harvey 1998; Himbara 1994).

The new policies of the Kenyatta government helped to create a new business
class made up of predominantly Kikuyu. The top managers in the parastatals were
Kikuyu and prominent public positions were also filled with Kikuyu. ―The most
successful Kikuyu capitalists were notables in President Kenyatta‘s own family or in
key state institutions‖ (Himbara 1994:477). This class was instrumental in utilizing
the state to accumulate capital and develop itself as an indigenous Kenyan
bourgeoisie. Government positions were filled with members of Kenyatta ethnic
group included the Chairman of Kenya Commercial Bank, Chairman of the ICDC,
the Minister of Finance (current President of Kenya), and the Governor of the
Central Bank of Kenya (Himbara 1994).

When Moi came to power at the end of 1978, he maintained the policies of
controls on foreign companies and preferences for domestic firms. However, the
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government shifted domestic preferences from the Kikuyu to Kalenjin, Moi‘s ethnic
group. This shift in ethnic preference under President Moi undermined the Kikuyudominated entrepreneurial and political classes. As was the case in the agricultural
sector, in his bid to consolidate power, President Moi ―removed most of the members
of the Kikuyu elite from state positions in a wholesale fashion‖ (Himbara 1994:477).
Those in the Kenyatta government who had access to state financing and other statesupported credit lost their privileges and President Moi replaced them with Kalenjins
and party loyalists. ―The transfer of power from Kenyatta to Moi presidency
adversely affected many would-be African industrialists and commercial
entrepreneurs who appeared promising in the 1970s‖ (Himbara 1994:470), referring
to the then-emerging Kikuyu entrepreneurial class.

5.3

Lifting Controls on Foreign Exchange and Investors

At the start of the efforts to liberalize the sector in 1980, Kenya had a
relatively well-developed financial sector consisting of the Central Bank, 16
commercial banks, five development banks, 15 non-Bank financial institutions,
several other financial intermediaries, and a securities exchange. The Kenyan
government owned 100 percent of the largest commercial bank, three of the
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development banks, and the specialized institutions lending to agriculture, tourism
and housing. It also owned shares in several commercial banks and two development
banks (Bank 1981:10).

By the early1980s, high inflation and public debt, mismanagement of
financial institutions, and government restrictions created an unstable
macroeconomic environment in need of reform. Much of Kenya‘s deteriorating and
unstable macroeconomic condition was also due to adverse effects of the world
economic recession in the late 1970s—effects that began to be felt in the early 1980s
with low foreign investment in Kenya. Economic growth also suffered. The average
annual growth rates of real gross domestic product declined from 5.2 percent
between 1974 and 1979 to 4.1 between 1980 and 1989 and further declined to 2.5
percent between 1990 and 1995 (Kenya 1997).

Government critics, especially in the Kikuyu entrepreneur community,
argued that government controls and corruption hampered investments. Policies of
controls and shifts in government preferences led to many Kikuyu losing their
privileged economic and political positions in the 1980s as President Moi
consolidated his power. In retaliation and to discredit Moi‘s policies in favor of the
tenets of liberalization, this entrepreneur community embraced what came to be
called the ―get the government off our backs‖ position that liberalization promotes
(Holmquist et al. 1994:98).
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Holmquist et al. (1994) noted a certain irony in the strong appeal of ―get the
government off our backs‖ to the non-Kalenjin who ―were, in the recent past, major
beneficiaries of state largesse—some literally almost creatures of the state—but who
now feel isolated from it with the new ethnic make-up of the state sector under Moi‖
(98). The Moi government came under pressure and was blamed for the economic
decline. Calls to lift controls on investors became part of the national movement for
reform. When the IFIs began to engage with the Moi government on reform, they
found in Kenya a large and influential segment of the business and international
finance community that was ready and could align with them to press the
government. ―The result was a formidable de facto alliance between this element
[Kikuyu business class] and the external donors […] mandating a shrinking of the
state and the presumed liberation of market forces in its wake‖ (Holmquist et al.
1994:98).

As early as the late 1970s, before the IMF and the World Bank began to
promote liberalization in Kenya, the government was drafting plans to reform. The
authors of Kenya‘s 1979-1983 Development Plan argued for greater reliance on
markets and for improving the efficiency of the public sector as way to respond to
the economic crisis that began after the 1973 oil shock. The government started to
liberalize Kenya‘s financial sector during that time to make it a friendlier
environment for business (O'Brien and Ryan 2001). Table 9 illustrates some of the
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key changes indicating government liberalization efforts. In 1983, Kenya lifted some
restrictions on repatriation of foreign investors‘ dividends and profits. In 1984, the
Central Bank reduced taxes on royalties and dividend income to help create a
friendly business environment. In 1986, Kenya revised its Foreign Investment Act to
attract foreign investment. In 1993, the government removed more barriers on
foreign exchange to attract foreign direct investment and to enhance Kenya‘s export
markets. Virtually all of these reform happened without significant pressures from
the external actors (Kenya 1997; Lehman 1992).

In 1995, Kenya lifted all controls on foreign exchange transactions and
foreign investors by repealing the Exchange Control Act, which enabled more
private investors to enter the foreign exchange market by securing licenses from the
Central Bank to establish foreign exchange bureaux. By 1996, Kenya had 13 private
Foreign Exchange Bureaux, which grew to more than 30 by 1999, making
international transactions easier for investors (Kenya 1997; Barkan 1995; Central
Bank of Kenya: www.centralbank.go.ke).
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Table 9: Liberalizing Changes: Creating a Business-Friendly Environment
Year
1983

Description of Policy Changes
The Central Bank introduced policy to allow repatriation of foreign investors' dividends and profit payments for 1982.

1984

The Central Bank lowered taxes on royalties and dividend income.

1986

The government revised the Foreign Investment Act to encourage foreign capital/investment in the technology sector.

1987

The Minister of Finance, in the 1987 Budget Speech, called on foreign investors to invest in Kenya and promised them a
friendly business environment.

1988

The government provided increased tax incentives, private capital investment, and revised the Foreign Investment
Protection Act to allow foreign exchange losses on hard currency investments to be tax-deductible.
Kenya also signed the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) of the World Bank, promising not to impose
noncommercial risks to foreign enterprises/investors.

1989

Government passed the Restrictive Practices and Monopolies Commission Act to ensure fair trade, economic competition,
and market conduct.

1993

NCPB reduced some restriction on maize and wheat exports and allowed more private investors in the auction market.
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1994

Six banks and 11 NBFIs were ordered liquidated or restructured by the CBK because of serious violations of Kenya‘s
banking regulations.
Kenya signed IMF‘s Article VIII and its currency became convertible.

1995

Kenya lifted controls on international transactions on its current account.

1996

The government amended the Central Bank Act to give it more authority/independence.

1998

Five major financial institutions experienced crises requiring the Central Bank to take supervisory actions by putting them
under statutory management.

2000

The IMF required conditionality for several financial sector reforms, including amendments to the Banking Act to control
fraud, issuing of prudential regulations, reviewing deposit insurance, strengthening CBK supervisory authority, and
privatizing the then state-owned Kenya Commercial Bank (KCB).

Structural fiscal conditionality targeted the improvement of expenditure commitment and control, reducing arrears,
improving pay for external audit staff, and timely submission of audited accounts to parliament.
Sources: (Lehman 1992; World Bank MIGA Membership Directory)
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5.4

Parastatals and Privatization of Financial Institutions

As the state-owned financial institutions (banks and non-banks) sought to
assist local businesses, they became saddled with non-performing loans. These
institutions included two commercial banks, nine development finance institutions,
and over 20 NBFIs (Brownbridge 1998; Himbara 1994). Among the major loanissuing financial institutions were the Kenya National Bank, the Commercial Bank
of Kenya, the Industrial Development Bank (IDB), the Joint Loan Boards (JLBs),
and the Development Finance Corporation of Kenya (DFCK), and the Industrial and
Commercial Development Corporation (ICDC). The ICDC was to provide various
types of loans to Kenyans—commercial loans to enable them to expand their
businesses, property loans to allow them to acquire or build commercial premises,
and ―share-holding loans to enable Africans to purchase shares in larger existing
companies‖ (Himbara 1994:472). In 1971, the Kenyan government took a 40 percent
share in the foreign bank National and Grindlays to form the Kenyan National
Commercial Bank (Swainson 1980).

The newly independent government recognized the importance of foreign
businesses as ―wealth creators‖ and as a modernizing force for Kenya‘s economy but
it did not want Kenya‘s development to rely solely on them. ―Such a reliance on
external actors was regarded as potentially unreliable, economically risky, and, most
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importantly, politically unacceptable‖ (Himbara 1994:470). Therefore, soon after
independence, the government announced policies to replace ex-colonial
administrators with Kenyans, policies that have been characterized as
―Kenyanization‖ or ―Africanization‖ of the economy. The policies involved the use
of the state-owned financial institutions to provide access to credit and finance
services to Kenyan businesses, services that they were not able to access during the
colonial period (Grosh 1991; Muller 1981).

The transfer of foreigners‘ businesses to Kenyans under the Trade Licensing
Act and the state‘s efforts to have Kenyans lead public companies, did not help
Kenya build a strong indigenous capital base, as the proponents of ―Kenyanizing‖ of
the economy thought. Despite government support of domestic businesses through
state policies and financial assistance through loan-issuing parastatals, the local
businesses were not sustainable. In 1973, a government official publicly expressed
―worry over the deterioration of financial control and general efficiency of public
enterprises‖ (Mwale 2000:65), putting at risk not only the public enterprises
themselves but also the local businesses that they were supposed to support.

The failure of the local businesses was due to lack of managerial experience,
mismanagement, and general economic decline in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
Managers of the businesses did not have the necessary experience and yet were
appointed to lead the enterprises. Grosh (1991) observes that ―[s]ome managers and
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directors [were] appointed to parastatals for political reasons that have nothing to do
with their ability to head the firm in question‖ (155). Himbara (1994) also notes that
―[m]ost of the firms associated with [the parastatals] were inefficient, poorly
managed, unprofitable, and a burden on the taxpayer on account of heavy budgetary
subsidies made to them year after year‖ (474-5). Most of the portfolios of the two
major loan-issuing parastatals were either in arrears or nonperforming. Some loans
had to be cancelled because the clients were in default (Himbara 1994).

Political and economic pressures (discussed in chapter three) reflected in the
financial sector and forced President Moi to concede to reform. As public corruption
and ethnic nepotism was rampant, the public demanded financial reforms. After
having taken steps to deregulate financial markets and lift controls on investors,
domestic investors, too, increased their involvement in the sector. With their
increased involvement came power to challenge the Moi government for favorable
policies and reform. Their influence increased as they ventured into commercial
banking. Kenya‘s domestic investors went from owning zero commercial banks in
1980 to owning four in 1985, which increased to seven in 1991 and 17 by 1994. At
the time, these 17 commercial banks represented a 25 percent share of the deposit
market. Kenya‘s domestic investors grew even stronger in the nonbank financial
institutions industry. These investors went from owning eight NBFIs in 1980 to 24 in
1985 and 35 in 1994 and holding a 50 percent share of the deposit market (Daumont,
Le Gall, and Leroux 2004:31).
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This internal entrepreneurial class was more influential than external actors in
pushing the government to reform the sector, as reform in the sector would naturally
increase the client base of the domestic entrepreneurs‘ businesses. The government
began such institutional reform—that is, privatizing and/or divesting from stateowned institutions to reduce its involvement in the economy—in the late 1980s.
Privatization of Kenya‘s Commercial Bank, for example, a bank that had the most
branches in rural communities, meant that these entrepreneurs would become owners
of many of these branches and be able to expand their businesses.

In 1988, the government divested a 40 percent share from the Kenya
Commercial Bank (KCB). From 1988 to 1997, the government divested from three
additional banks, two development finance corporations, and eight subsidiaries of the
KCB (see Table 8 below) primarily through the method of public flotation. The
reason for the government‘s choice of divestiture through flotation was unclear, but
since divestiture is the strongest way to show commitment to transparency and
private sector involvement (Ngugi 2000), it is reasonable to argue that the Moi
government sought to reduce the pressure that it was under between 1988 and 1990,
trying to show to the public that it was committed to reform and transparency.
Divestiture through flotation is also highly susceptible to political pressure by
politicians, interest groups, and employees of the company being privatized. Moi
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was under considerable pressure from many sources: Transportation Minister Matiba
resigned from his government, labor strikes were on the increase, and the nonKalenjin businesses were agitated for reform.
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Table 10: Privatization of Banks and NBFIs 1988 – 1997
Year

Company

Kenya Commercial Bank

GoK
Share
Before
(%)
100

GoK
Share
After
(%)
60

1988
and
1990
1992

Housing Finance Company of Kenya

50

1994

National Bank of Kenya

1996

1997

Buyer

Privatization
Method

Individual/
institutional
investors

Public
Floatation

30

Individual/
institutional
investors

Public
Floatation

100

42.5

Individual/
institutional
investors

Public
Floatation

Kenya National Corporation

42.5

22.5

Individual/
institutional
investors

Public
Floatation

Stanbic Kenya Limited

40

23
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Sinclair
(SBIC)

Pre-emptive
Rights

Kencom House Ltd*12
Kenya Commercial Finance Corp*
United Finance Company of Kenya*
Notcutt Longatoni*
Savings and Loan Kenya Ltd*
Industrial Promotion Services*
Clarkson Notcutt*
Loncom Limited*

N/A

N/A

Individual/
institutional
investors

Public
Floatation

Source: (World Bank 2001

12(*) These were subsidiaries and associated companies of Kenya Commercial Bank. The Moi government partially divested from KCB in 1988 and

1990 before the IFIs-funded Parastatals Reform Technical Assistance Program of 1992. These subsidiaries and associated companies were
privatized in 1997 to complete Kenya’s full divestiture from the bank.
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5.5

Addressing Public-Sector Corruption

The history of IFI conditionality-related aid and the frequency with which
scholars have pointed out its limitations in forcing countries to adopt reform further
strengthens the case for greater consideration of domestic actors‘ role in bringing
about reform. When the Kenyan government received its first concessional loan from
the World Bank in 1980, it agreed to address corruption and reform its civil service
sector by reducing the number of state employees. But the state did not reform the
sector as pledged. Instead, the civil service sector expanded, as illustrated in Table
10 below. Kenya went from having 200,000 public employees in 1963 to over
500,000 by 1982 and to more than 715,000 in 1991.

Table 11: Employment in Public Sector: 1962, 1982, and 1991

Public sector (‗000s)
Private sector (‗000s)

1963
200.4
385.0

% Public of total employment
34.2
Source: (Cohen 1993:452)

1982
505.6
540.4

1991
715.1
726.6

48.2

49.6

Increases in public sector employment resulted in a large percentage of the
national budget being allocated for salaries and benefits. During the 1991-1992 fiscal
year, the period of the first multi-party elections, nearly 79 per cent of government
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fiscal resources were allocated to the recurrent budget. In 1993, after excluding debt
servicing, principal and interests, 59 percent of recurrent budget was spent on wages,
salaries, and other benefits for public sector employees (Cohen 1993:453).

Government ministries went from 23 in 1982 to 31 by 1991 even when the
number of departments decreased from ten to six during the same period.
Government wholly owned parastatals went from 69 to 71 and government majority
shares in others increased from 111 to 120 during the 1982-1991 period (Cohen
1993:451). According to Bigsten and Moene, unnecessary positions were added at
the Permanent Secretary and ministerial levels. Politically powerful ministries were
spending beyond budgetary limits. Part of the money was used to finance parastatals
that created employment slots to be allocated to allies of the government‘s
―supporting coalition‖ even if they did ―not meet the required qualifications‖
(1993:181).

Some argued that the expansion of the public bureaucracy was a strategy of
the ruling elites to maintain their ruling coalition (Bigsten and Moene 1993), which
if it were done properly would be considered normal as in any typical parliamentary
system in need of a coalition to form a government; but others posited that the
increases in public employment and expenditures were indicative of public
corruption and ethnic favoritism because most of those employed were Kalenjin and
KANU loyalists (Kanyinga 2004). Critics of the government pointed to the fact that
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members of the Kalenjin ethnic group disproportionately occupied cabinet posts and
permanent secretaries during the Moi presidency as evidence for their claims of
corruption and ethnic favoritism. It was within this context of increased public sector
employment during the Moi presidency that internal actors demanded reforms to
combat corruption in government.

Despite the failure to address public sector corruption, Kenya continued to
receive financial assistance from the World Bank and the IMF. The IMF exhibited
similar weaknesses to the World Bank in its programs with respect to the power of
conditionality to force Kenya to embrace liberalization during the Moi presidency.
The IMF financial aid to Kenya was for broad structural reform, including for
reforming the public sector and combatting corruption (IMF 2008).

From 1980 to 2000, Kenya received 12 loans from the IMF (some joint with
the World Bank) totaling special drawing rights (SDRs) 922 million (see Appendix
D).13 Kenya was number seven among the top ten countries classified as having
―prolonged use of IMF resources,‖ from the time it entered its first program in 1975
to 2000. Prolonged use was defined as having spent at least seven years out of any
ten years under IMF arrangements. Kenya spent 19.2 years and all of its
arrangements (loans) were over 100 percent of its quota (IMF 2002:24+29).

13Special Drawing Right (SDR) is an international reserve asset created by the IMF and credited

to member countries to supplement their existing reserve assets.
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Similar to the World Bank, ―[w]hen a country borrows from the IMF, it
agrees to adjust its economic policies to overcome the problems that led it to seek
funding in the first place‖ (www.imf.org). Given these facts and in light of the
influence that many scholars have ascribed to the IMF, it would be reasonable to
conclude that the IMF should have had considerable control over Kenya‘s policy
decisions during the Moi presidency. Yet the IMF complained in 2004 that its policy
recommendations regarding corruption and good governance practices were not
implemented during the Moi period (IMF 2009).

The World Bank, too, acknowledged the weaknesses of its programs and
complained that lack of ownership on the part of the Moi government prevented the
implementation of its policy recommendations. A review of its support to Kenya
going back to 1961 pointed to mixed results with respect to effectiveness, outcomes,
institutional development and sustainability. It listed poor design and inadequate
ownership among the stakeholders, including some in the government (Bank 1998).

It was not the first time that both the World Bank and IMF fell short of their
objectives in Kenya and yet the institutions continued to disburse financial aid. The
Moi government knew this and therefore the threats from the IFIs to suspend
financial aid were not a significant factor in pushing the government toward
reforming the public sector and addressing government corruption. Continued to get
frustrated by the government‘s lack of initiative to address corruption and promote
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good governance practices, which the IMF argued were ―key to improving Kenya‘s
economic performance,‖ the institutions suspended their financial aid for most of the
1990s (Bank 1998; IMF 2009:5). Despite the suspension of financial aid, however,
Kenya continued with reforms to combat public sector corruption, indicating that it
was not the IMF and the World Bank that were the primary actors pushing it to
undertake such reforms.

5.6

Conclusion

The goal of this chapter was to show how domestic pressures, especially
pressures from the non-Kalenjin business elite, combined with pressures from a
failing economy, and the external actors linked to broader national campaigns to
push the Moi government to concede to reform. Having been alienated from their
privileged political and economic positions by Moi, members of the Kikuyu political
and economic elite and allies protested and demanded reforms. Their agitation and
demands coincided with efforts by the IMF and the World Bank and the two sets of
actors created an alliance of convenience. Absent of the efforts of the internal actors,
the IFIs would not be in position to significantly influence Kenya‘s behavior toward
liberalization.
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The external actors could not move Kenya toward liberalization despite the
influence they were said to have because of their financial power and conditionality
they imposed. However, evidence provided in this chapter suggested that
conditionality as a tool had limited influence in forcing Kenya to embrace
liberalization. Rather than external actors, the chapter argued that internal pressures
were more influential in forcing the Moi government toward reform. As economic
conditions deteriorated and various groups got agitated because they lost their
privileged positions in Kenya‘s deeply-rooted ethnic rivalry, the Moi government
was forced to concede to reforms. The government started by lifting controls on
investors in 1983, deregulating financial markets, and divesting from state-owned
financial institutions as the decade wore on. These reforms led to greater shares of
the sector in the hands of Kenya‘s private investors.
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CHAPTER SIX
CONCLUSION: THE LIMITS OF EXTERNAL INFLUENCE AND THE
POWER OF DOMESTIC ACTORS AND FACTORS

6.1

Concluding Analysis

The conventional explanation for developing nations undertaking reform has
focused on external actors, the underlying rationale being that developing countries
over the last 30 years have been forced by the IFIs to reform by virtue of their
dependence on the IFIs for development aid. This explanation certainly has some
merit but it also underrepresents the work and influence of domestic actors and
conditions in bringing about political and economic reform. The merits and
shortcomings of the IFI-influence argument have been examined exhaustively in a
number of other studies, and some are discussed in Chapter One of this dissertation.
The IFI-influence explanation is only part of the story in Kenya‘s case, however. It is
only part of the story in Kenya because of the compelling domestic factors at play
there, factors that the IFIs could not overcome on their own.
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The emphasis on the role of domestic actors and factors in bringing about
liberalization in Kenya puts in context the role the external actors had played. When
considering the role of external actors in the context of Kenya‘s history dating back
to colonialism and postcolonial politics, it becomes clear that the IFIs‘ influence in
bringing about liberalization was complementary and secondary. In fact, well before
domestic actors‘ agitation for reform reached its peak in 1990, for over ten years the
IFIs and Kenya had engaged in an on-again off-again relationship without realizing
any substantial reform.

What can be deduced, however, based on the length of time the IFIs have
been involved in Kenya and the level of assistance they have provided, is that if they
had more influence than domestic actors or were the primary drivers of
liberalization, as many have argued, Kenya would have been a ―model student.‖ The
reforms the IFIs demanded would have been implemented easily and with a high rate
of success. This was not the case, however, under President Moi. Instead, the
relationship between the IFIs and Kenya turned out to be frustrating and contentious,
indicating the limited nature of the power of the IFIs to force their will on Kenya.

Illustrative of the stalemate was the IMF‘s offer to loan staff to the Kenyan
government to help it write legislation. The IMF made the offer because it was
frustrated that the government was not moving fast enough on reforms. But the
President and many parliamentarians did not believe in the reforms or they needed
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more time to evaluate them. The offer was turned down, and even civic organizations
that were generally supportive of the IMF‘s efforts called its offer meddling in a
country‘s internal affairs. The effect was that domestic actors frustrated the efforts of
external actors—and they often did in Kenya—even when the external actors had
power over the country by virtue of their financial position.

This incident shows how domestic forces and considerations can frustrate the
efforts of the IFIs, though it does not necessarily mean that external forces have no
influence at all. The Moi government complained about ―outside forces‖ having been
behind ―unconstitutional bills‖ being ―pushed [on] the government‖ and pledged to
resist those forces, referencing the IFIs as those forces (Kamau 2001:3). Therefore,
there is no doubt about the reach of the IFIs to influence parliamentary debate around
reforms, but having that kind of influence does not necessarily translate into
―causing‖ actual reforms. In order to actually assess which type of actors—internal
or external—can bring more effective influence or pressure to bear in moving a
country toward reform, it is best for scholars to take a micro-level approach to the
analysis. A micro-level approach involving interviews with activists, experts, and
participants on the ground enables one to better understand how what may have
seemed to be minor events had major consequences on the behavior of the state.
Such an analytical approach would help answer questions about the extent to which
externally imposed conditionality, the primary mechanism through which IFIs‘
leverage is used to force countries to reform, can actually force countries to reform.
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6.2

Limits of External Influence and Aid Suspension

As discussed in the previous chapters of this dissertation, Kenya had IFI
conditionality imposed in a number of areas, both political and economic.
Conditionality terms alone had no significant impact on the reform process. When
domestic actors were involved in pressuring the government, however, there was
movement toward reform.

IFI pressure for reforms under President Moi throughout the 1980s did not
result in any significant policy changes. In most cases, there seemed to be agreement
on the need for reform, or some reforms would be initiated, but the government
would renege, causing suspension of support from IFIs or Parliament would pass
reform measures but there would be little or no implementation of the laws. This
pattern went on for over ten years. Threats and suspension of financial aid by the
IFIs did not improve the prospect for policy implementation. Part of the reason
threats of aid suspension were not effective was because Kenya could always find
financial assistance elsewhere, as donors had conflicting interests and often sent
conflicting signals as to the seriousness of their threats. Press (2004) sought to make
this same point when he argued that the IFIs and donor countries failed to leverage
their funding to compel President Moi to improve his human rights:
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The donors as a whole failed to use their aid leverage for reforms
collectively except for a dramatic moment in November 1991.
Otherwise they sent conflicting signals to the regime which in turn
attempted to play the game well enough with concessions aimed at
staving off real threats to its power and at keeping aid money flowing
(143).
Even the ―dramatic moment‖ in late 1991 was not the primary force pushing
President Moi to concede to reform. The donors committed to suspend $350 million,
but the actual amount suspended was only $115 million, less than a third of the
amount threatened.14 For that year, the suspended aid amounted to only a 12 percent
reduction from the previous year. It is a reasonable argument to make that the
amount of funds suspended was not such that it would have a significant impact on
the conduct of the government.

Kenya‘s refusal to comply with the demands of the IFIs was reflected in the
number of times that its financial aid packages were suspended: at least two
suspensions for non-compliance in each decade from 1980 to 2000. When aid was
suspended in 1991, it took two years before another agreement could be reached.
After a suspension in 1997, it took another three years of negotiation for a new
package; and as Press (2005) puts it, ―[h]ad the funding issue been pivotal, the
regime would likely have moved swiftly to meet the demands of the donors, which

14Development aid to Kenya in 1991 totaled US$1.1 billion. In 1992, it was US$987 million, for a

difference of US$115 million (Press 2005:10).
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were primarily economic, not political in 1991‖ (14). Further suspensions followed
within months after the new arrangements.

The frequency of aid suspension would be surprising if a country‘s embrace
of reform were indeed linked to receiving development financial assistance. In
Kenya‘s case, however, whatever leverage the IFIs had, it was not independent of
stronger, more influential domestic factors. Throughout those years, the government
was rebuked by the IFIs but there was no strong call from the IFIs for significant
political and economic reform. It was not until after domestic actors rose against
deteriorating internal conditions that President Moi conceded to calls for reform.
Less than a year after the attempted coup, for example—a coup that the plotters
claimed was a response to government corruption—the government initiated both
political and market reforms by lifting controls on investors. After popular protests in
1989 and 1990, the government launched political and market reform by divesting of
parastatals.

6.3

Resilience of Domestic Factors: Customary Land Rights

The limit of external influence was also apparent in the issue of
individualized property rights. The IFIs had some influence in promoting
individualized land tenure rights, something that they have been promoting in Kenya
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since the 1950s under similar assumptions to those of the Swynnerton Plan
(assumptions that individual free-holding property rights would induce economic
growth through increased credit, increased investment in agriculture because of land
tenure security, and the increase in land area controlled by the most efficient
farmers). As in the colonial period, these benefits did not materialize because of
ethnic traditions, as some of these assumptions could not be fully practiced. The
assumptions failed because the IFIs neglected to consider the durability of customary
traditions in the ethnic communities. The assumed benefits of individual free-holding
rights were not sufficient to override customary tribal traditions and tribal
communities continued to practice communal land tenure (property) rights.
Attempting to institute a liberalizing system led to direct confrontation with tribal
traditions (Kieyah and Kameri-Mbote 2010).

This contradiction between customary and legal land rights resulted in
confrontation among ethnic communities in post-colonial Kenya. Land disputes were
the outcome of the system that created land markets where affluent members of
different communities could acquire land in other‘s traditional areas, effectively
negating the customary land rights practiced among virtually all ethnic groups in
Kenya. Under an authoritarian one-party system, the state contained such conflict
until it could no longer manage it, as agitation for political reform intensified in the
early 1990s. Ethnic violence over land and other political rights occurred in the
Narok District between the Maasai and Kikuyu in 1992, and in the Trans-Mara
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District in 1997 between the Maasai and Gusii. This type of ethnic violence
continued up to the last presidential election in 2007. Maina Kiai, Chairman of
Kenya‘s National Commission on Human Rights, explained the root cause of ethnic
violence was land. The Kenyatta government failed to returned ex-settlers land to
tribes who originally lived in some areas in the Rift Valley and their resentment
against Kenyatta‘s tribe, the Kikuyu, persists to today (Gettleman 2008).

There were also reform assumptions that did not materialize simply due to
the nature of agriculture, especially as it relates to smallholdings. The assumption
that individualized land tenure would induce increased credit to farmers failed to
materialize because it did not take into account that credit agencies would be
reluctant to issue credit to small farmers because of the high risks involved in such
an investment in Kenya‘s ethnically divided society. A willing purchaser would have
difficulty obtaining credit to buy land, as credit agencies would have difficulty
foreclosing on properties in the event of default because of the prevalence of
customary tenure. In short, the benefits of individualized land rights did not
materialize because of a disconnect between its objectives and the actual practices on
the ground (Kieyah and Kameri-Mbote 2010).

This domestic reality was not something that IFI conditionality could have
influenced in a way that would make it conducive to reform. Recognizing the
challenge of customary land rights, President Moi had to issue a presidential
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directive aimed at requiring family members and title-holders to enter into agreement
prior to any sale or the use of land as collateral. How these agreements would be
enforced and how they would be verified was not clear. ―Under such circumstances,‖
as Pinckney and Kimuyu (1994) put it, ―it is not surprising that there is little supply
of land-secured credit, and those who do receive such credit frequently pull political
strings or have access to substantial off-farm income‖ (5). Domestic actors are more
likely to be the primary actors in reforming such a customary land tenure system.

6.4

Effects of Colonialism and Ethnic Politics

The way in which colonial administrators manipulated ethnic interests to
govern Kenya set a precedent that has affected the way in which Kenya has been
governed since independence. Post-colonial Kenyan leaders learned how policies of
the colonial administrators benefited settlers and their commercial supporters. They,
too, adopted policies that favored their ethnic groups and their allies. It may be that
some individuals in particular ethnic groups believed in liberalization, or at least
professed to, but they believed in it within the context of ethnic politics. These
leaders have catered to their ethnic groups, and when a leader of a tribe takes control
of the state, the inclination is to establish systems that favor his/her tribal
communities (Amutabi 2009). This does not mean that all other groups were
completely excluded and marginalized; rather, it means that the tribe of the president
146

received a disproportionate share of public positions and resources. Statistics
provided in this dissertation show this was the case under both Kenyatta and Moi.

The way in which President Moi used ethnic politics to create a financial
crisis, which in turn allowed him to further marginalize the Kikuyu business elites, is
an indication of the power of domestic actors and factors in influencing reform. In
retaliation, influential members of the Kikuyu community joined the opposition
against the Moi government. This confrontation between the Kikuyu business and
political elites and President Moi resulted in increased government repression of
political opposition, which in turn further heightened popular protests against the
government. By the summer and fall of 1990, the agitation for reform had reached a
peak, leading to increased protests, which were followed by increased use of force by
the government against the protestors (Lehman 1992). Seeing the level of domestic
unrest, the IFIs decided to support the protestors. The indicator of their support was
their announcement of aid cancellation to the Moi government. All of these pressure
points eventually forced President Moi to concede to reform.

Just as the consequences of harmful colonial policies and practices led to
protests and rebellion, so too did the policies of Moi and his government. Economic
hardship and political repression, infused with tribal resentment, led people to the
streets to demand political and economic reforms. Protests over economic malaise
and political corruption and repression broadened when it was alleged that
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government security forces were complicit in the murder of Foreign Minister Robert
Ouko. Soon, university faculty associations and leaders of civic society organizations
joined the protests. By the end of July 1990, President Moi agreed to political party
reform, starting with his ruling KANU party. Among the major complaints against
him were tribal favoritism, political corruption, and too much concentration of
power. This domestic pressure for reform, and the government‘s initial consideration
of reform measures, were the beginning of political liberalization in Kenya and the
catalyst for the announcement of broader reforms the following year. Contrary to IFI
pressure, these events show that it was internal popular protests that kick-started
efforts for reform (Legovini 2002).

Reforms were influenced more by the efforts of domestic actors and the
general context of domestic politics, including the existence long historical rivalry
among Kenya‘s politically important ethnic groups. Domestic actors, through
protests and various forms of public pressure, were able to create space to challenge
President Moi and his ruling KANU party. Even though popular pressures forced
KANU leaders to claim that they believed in reform, as they had pledged to the IFIs,
they did all they could to maintain their authority to safeguard the status quo. This
was to be expected, as reforms entailed the opening of political and economic spaces
for other groups to participate.
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The political and economic reforms in Kenya cannot be fully understood
outside the entrenched historical rivalry among Kenya‘s three politically important
ethnic groups: the Kikuyu, Kalenjin, and Luo. Political and economic reforms under
President Moi up to 1992 were attempts to alter the direction of or completely
reverse policies that were implemented in the 1960s and 1970s under the Kenyatta
government. President Moi sought reforms that would weaken Kikuyu advantages
and increase those of the Kalenjin and his allies. He took advantage of IFI financial
support in many instances in the 1980s but carried out little to no externally imposed
reform. Areas that would have had adverse implications for his power were never
reformed in the way that the IFIs wanted. The National Cereal and Produce Board
(NCPB), for example, which the IFIs wanted privatized since the early 1980s, did
not see any reform until 1992 because the NCPB was an effective mechanism for
President Moi to channel largesse to supporters, especially Kalenjins, in the
agricultural sector (S. Ambrose, personal correspondence, February 15, 2012). It was
not until his political power was threatened in 1990 by popular protests that President
Moi conceded to political reforms.

6.5

Implications of Domestic-Actor Focused Study for Reform

Through a domestic-focused explanation for Kenya‘s (often reluctant)
embrace of political and economic reform and why IFI influence on the reforms in
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Kenya was limited, this dissertation contributes to the literature on the design and
implementation of reform and development programs, a contribution that has policy
relevance both for developing countries and for international financial institutions.
Kenya‘s persistent non-compliance with IFI conditionalities while at the same time
achieving real progress toward reform points to the influence of a number of
domestic actors and conditions—including the nature of ethnic division and politics
influenced by a legacy of colonialism—that donors in the future should consider in
their reform program blueprints. In designing reform policies and programs, all
efforts should be made to understand how each project would affect different ethnic
group.

A micro-level analysis that elucidates the role that popular protests and
resentment had in forcing President Moi to concede to reform affirms the importance
of these factors and leads to a recommendation that the international financial
institutions consult with domestic activists from all sectors as part of their
engagement with governments on any reform initiative. This recommendation is very
important for two reasons. First, if development policies are to be successful, all of
the internal actors must be fully involved in all stages of the policy process –
planning, designing, and implementation – because ultimately these actors are
primary in determining the extent to which policies are implemented. Second and
more importantly, it is they who will have to live with the consequences of the
policies.
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APPENDIX A:
LOCATING KENYA: MAPS AND CURRENT STATISTICS
The former colony of Great Britain is located in East Africa and borders
Ethiopia, Tanzania, Uganda, and Somalia. Kenya is more than twice the size of the
U.S. state of Nevada with a total area of 580,367 square kilometers. It currently has a
population of 43 millions growing at a rate of 2.44 percent making Kenya is the 31st.
most populated country in the world, between Tanzania and Argentina. Life
expectancy at birth is 63.07 years (male: 61.62; female: 64.55) with a median age of
18.9 years.15 The maps below provide more details about Kenya‘s territorial
characteristics.

Administratively, Kenya is divided into seven provinces and the area of Nairobi.
The country adopted a new constitution promulgated in August 2010, which
―designates 47 yet-to-be-defined counties as first-order administrative units‖ (CIA
Factbook 2012). The new constitution also abolishes the position of prime minister
and establishes a bicameral legislature. Many of the provisions in the new
constitutions have yet to be finalized and will not probably be enforced during the
next administration. The next presidential election was supposed to be held in the fall
of this year, but there is news that it has been postponed until March 2013.

15

United States Central Intelligence Agency. 2012. The World Factbook (Washington, D.C.).
<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ke.html>. Accessed on
March 3, 2012.
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Appendix B: Selected Events under President Moi
Year Political events

Economic
policies/Events
1982  Kenya's National Assembly declares  Creation of the
KANU Kenya‘s the sole legal party.
Central Bank of Kenya.
Press censorship and political
detentions increase.
 Change in exchange
rate regime (fixed to
 Attempted coup d‘état in August led crawling).
by a Luo officer in the Kenyan Air
Force. Oginga Odinga accused of being
involved in the plot and placed under
house arrest.
1984  Increased anti-government protests,
including emergence of dissident
student groups.

 Severe drought caused
corn and other staples
shortages.
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Relations with
IFIs
 Second World
Bank Structural
Adjustment Credit
approved.

1986  Student protests and public education
campaigns increased. Parliamentarians
critical of the government arrested and
accused of being connected to
Mwakenya, a leftist movement.

 Coffee boom. This
helped the government
to reduce its budget
deficit.

 Vote by secret ballot replaced with
"queue" voting where voters stand in
lines marked for their choice of
candidate. This was an attempt to
intimidate people from voting against
the government.
 Consolidation of executive power.
Parliament passed a constitutional
amendment to increase the president's
power over the civil service and the
judiciary.
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 World Bank
disbursed two
loans: $60 million
agricultural sector
adjustment
operation credit
and $13.2 million
agricultural sector
management
credit to reform
the National
Cereal and
produce Board
(NCPB).

1988  Moi dissolved the National Assembly
and released some political prisoners.
Moi re-elected president and many
opposition leaders arrested.

 World Bank
approved more
sectorial loans to
Kenya

 Constitution amended in July granting
the executive branch the power to
dismiss judges as well as extending
legal authority to detain without trial to
14 days (from 24 hours).

 Enhanced
Structural
Adjustment
Facility (ESAF)
agreement with
IMF. WB
approves financial
sector loan

1989 Minister Kenneth Mabita forced to
resign for criticizing the result of the
1988 election. Matiba became one of
the leaders of the opposition movement
in 1990.
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1990  Opposition to KANU‘s single-party
dominance intensified. In July, Charles
Rubia, Matiba and Raila Odinga were
arrested and detained without trial and
their public "pro-democracy" rallies
banned.
 Protests in the Central Province.
Government-sponsored review of
KANU in a one-party system. Public
discontent with the government and
KANU increased. In August, Oginga
Odinga and six prominent opposition
leaders, form the Forum for Restoration
of Democracy (FORD), a coalition of
different (multi-ethnic) opposition
groups.
1991  Moi accepted demands for political
pluralism.

 Kenya operating
 WB approves
under a dual exchange second
rate system.
agricultural and
export
development
 Kenya‘s Central
sector loans.
Bank lifted all
controls/restrictions on
commercial banks‘
loans. Commercial
banks were allowed to
determine fees and
interest rates on their
loans.

 International

donors announced
suspension of
$350 million in
quick-disbursing
loans from the
IMF.

 The National

Assembly amended the
constitution to allow for multi-party
elections and made it a requirement that
presidential candidates win at least 25%
of the vote in at least five of the eight
provinces, in addition to an overall
plurality. The president was given the
authority to appoint all (11) members of
the Electoral Commission

 WB approved

education sector
loan.
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1992  Establishment of more new political
parties. Mwai Kibaki's Democratic
Party, Odinga's FORD, and other
smaller parties such as the Social
Democratic Party, the Kenya National
Democratic Alliance, the People's
Union of Justice and New Order and
Islamic Party of Kenya.

 Goldenberg

scandal:Businessman
Kamlesh Pattni and
then-permanent
secretary in the Ministry
of Finance Wilfred
Koinange allegedly
exported nonexistent
gold as part of a credit FORD organized first legal opposition for-export program to
rally in over 20 years. Civil unrest
help Kenya recover
broke out in the west central region.
from the effects of the
Kalenjin warriors attack Kisii tea
First Gulf War. The
farmers, disrupting tea production.
fraudulent scheme cost
Outbreaks of violence continued to
Kenya over 2 billion
mount over the following two years,
shillings in export fees.
seeming to confirm the government's
predictions that multi-party politics
would exacerbate ethnic tension and
eventually splinter the country along
tribal lines. Opposition parties accused
the government of inciting the violence.
Estimated 2,300 people dead and
25,000 displaced.
 In

March women protesters attacked
by police with tear gas and batons
during a hunger strike to liberate
political prisoners. Demonstrations in
Kisumu, Odinga's stronghold, and the
western town of Homa Bay. New
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protests in Nairobi.

 In

the December elections, Moi won
the December presidential election with
36.35% of the votes (Kenneth Matiba
takes 26%, Mwai Kibaki 19.45%, and
Oginga Odinga 17.48%). Opposition
won 88 out of 188 seats in Parliament.
Opposition protested the election
results, calling them invalid on the
grounds of procedural irregularities, but
observers did not think the irregularities
merited annulments of the results.
1993  President Moi sworn in on January 4,  Kenyan Shilling
1993, for another five-year term.
allowed to float.

ESAF
agreement
with IMF.

1994  FORD disintegrates into rival ethnic
factions: FORD-Asili (Kikuyu), FORDKenya (Luo and Abaluhya).

International

1995

 International

aid

resumes in
December.

stops over
corruption/
management
disputes
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aid

2002 President Moi set to retire before the
 Anti-corruption and
end of 2002. Constitutional review set Economic Crimes Bill
to begin dialogue on a referendum on a failed to pass.
new Constitution.
 Government expands
 National Development Party (NDP) VAT to all goods and
joined KANU. The opposition National services. Minister of
Alliance for Change is formed
Agriculture announced
comprising Mwai Kibaki's Democratic end to Coffee Board of
Party, the National Party of Kenya led Kenya marketing
by Charity Ngilu, and Ford-Kenya
practices and 90%
headed by Kijana Wamalwa, Saba Saba retrenchment of its
Asili and Ford-Asili. Smaller
staff.
opposition alliance Ford-People/Safina
comprises Ford-People's Simeon
Nyachae and Paul Muite's Safina party.
Source: (Jonyo 2002; Kanyinga 2007; Legovini 2002)16

16

Table credited to Legovini 2002. Author made some revisions and added additional information from other sources as needed.
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Appendix C: World Bank Loans and Credit to Kenya’s Agricultural Sector, 1964-1997
Appraisal
Year
Commodities
1964
1968
1974
1977
1978
1979
1982
1989
Rural Dev’t
1976
1978
1979
Program Lend1982
1986
1991
Institutional
1983
1986
1987
1988

Loan (L) or
Credit (C)
Number
Phase

Project Name

Disbursement ($
million)

Disbursement
Approval
(percent)

C64
C119
L993
L1389
L1636
C914
C1237
C2062
Phase
L1303/C650
C858
C959
ing Phase
C1277
C1717/AFO21
C2204
Dev’t Phase
C1387
C1718
C1758
C1849
C1974

KTDA
Tea II
Tea Factory
S. Nyanza Sugar
Sugar Rehab
SH Coffee I
Cotton
SH Coffee II

2.2
0.1
10.4
25.0
12.8
10.5
21.6
30*

79
5
100
100
18
39
98
82*

IADP I
Narok ADP
IADP II

6.7
3.2
5.3

33
25
12

Grains Ag. TA
ASAO I
ASAO II

6.0
60.0
33.7

100
100
45

NEP I
ASMP I (NCPB)
Animal Health
NARP I
Rural Services

14.5
13.2
11.4
18.4
21.9

97
115
76
94
105
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1990
1992
1993
1995
1996
1997
Not Classified
1968
1969
1972

C2198
C2199
C2445
C2460
C2797
C2907
C2935

Forestry IV
NEP II
ASMP II
Drought Recovery
Arid Lands RMP
Lake Vic. EMP
NARP II

10.5
9
8*
12*
14*
8*
27*

C129
L641
C105
C344
C477
L1093/C537
L1132/C565
C692/L1390
L1389
C962
C1051
L1995/C1443

76
50*
55*
80
N/A
N/A
N/A

LS I
3.6
92
Forest I
2.6
100
SH Credit AFC
3.6
100
SH Credit II AFC 6.0
100
1974
LS II
12.5
58
1975
Group Farms
5.2
35
Forestry II
19.9
99
1977
Ag. Credit III
18.7
75
Bura Irrigation
34.9
87
1979
Baringo (SA)
4.0
62
1980
Fisheries
0.2
2
1981
Ag. Credit IV
35.0
100
AFC
1982
L2098/C1213 Forestry III
24.6
66
Source: (Bank 1998). * The full amount of the loan/credit and the percentage disbursed
was not known to the World Bank‘s Operations Evaluation Department.
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APPENDIX D: IMF/World Bank’s Arrangements with Kenya, 1980-2000
Year

Type

Original
Disbursed
Amount
(Million)
(Million)
1980 Stand-By Arrangement SDR 241.5
SDR 90
Supplementary Facility SDR 184.8
SDR 50.1
1982 Supplementary Facility SDR 96.8
SDR 96.8
Supplementary Facility SDR 60.4
SDR 60.4
1983 Stand-By Arrangement SDR 175.9
SDR 175.9
1985 Stand-By Arrangement SDR 85.2
SDR 85.2
1986 Compensatory Facility SDR 37.9
SDR 37.9
1988 SAF Loan
SDR 99.4
SDR 28.4
1989 ESAF Loan
SDR 241.4
SDR 216.2
1993 ESAF Loan
SDR 45.2
SDR 22.6
1996 ESAF Loan
SDR 149.6
SDR 24.9
2000 PRGF Loan
SDR 150
SDR 33.6
Source: (IMF 2001; IMF 2008:18; O'Brien and Ryan 2001)

17

Note

Remainder cancelled, 1982
Remainder cancelled, 1982

Replaced by ESAF, 1989
Remainder suspended, 199217
Remainder suspended, 1997

The suspended balance of this loan was renegotiated in December 1993 and was drawn by December 1994. Kenya was supposedly
under suspension.
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Special Drawing Right (SDR) is an international reserve asset created by the
IMF and credited to member countries to supplement their existing reserve assets.
The value of the SDR in U.S. dollar is calculated daily as the sum of the values in
U.S. dollars of the four major currencies in the world, the Euro, U.S. dollar, Japanese
yen, British pound sterling, based on exchange rates quoted at noon at the London
Stock Exchange. The SDR exchange rate is posted daily on the IMF web site:
www.imf.org. Countries that have been granted SDRs have to exchange them for
currencies from other members of the IMF with enough reserves to perform the
exchange.

Compensatory and Contingency Financing Facility (CCFF) provides
contingency loans to member countries experiencing temporary export shortfalls.
The CCFF also helps countries finance excess costs of cereal imports resulted from
circumstances beyond the members' control. In other words, this facility assists
members with financial aid arrangements to protect themselves from unexpected,
adverse external developments. In the case of Kenya, the 1986 compensatory loan
was to help the country respond to its need of maize crises caused by a major
drought started in 1983.

Stand-By Arrangements (SBAs) are described as the ―workhorse‖ in IMF
lending. SBAs are quick disbursing loans to a member countries that are
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experiencing balance-of-payment problems. Rates are non-concessional, which
means they carry an interest rates, although the rates are most often than not lower
than what countries would be charged by private markets. Kenya received three
stand-by loans in the first part of the 1980s totaling more than SDR 351 million.

The Supplementary Financing Facility was established in 1980 as a subsidy
account to help reduce the costs of financing incurred by eligible developing
countries. Countries use this subsidy to help cover periodic changes that they would
have made to the IMF General Resource Account. Kenya received such subsidy in
1980, but most of the fund had to be suspended because the IMF and Kenya could
not agree on the kind of reforms that the country should undertake.
Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF) loans were concessional loans given to
low-income member countries facing protracted balance-of-payments assistance.
These were typically joint loans with the World Bank and other lenders and were
conditioned on the recipient countries agreeing to undertake structural reform. Kenya
received one SAF loan, as the facility was being converted and extended to the
Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) from 1987 and 1993.

ESAF loans were similar to SAF loans but with broader terms and prospects
to higher amounts. As successor to the SAF, it had similar objective, eligibility, and
―program features, but differed in scope, terms of access, and funding sources.‖ In
1999, ESAF was replaced with the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF).
Currently, PRGF loans have the same terms as ESAF, but the IMF has more
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flexibility in considering social spending to reduce poverty. In other words, the IMF
is now able to consider conditionality around public social expenditures as part of its
economic growth strategy. 18

18

For more on these types of arrangements, see the respective IMF Factsheet and “IMF
Lending” Factsheet at www.imf.org; also Encyclopedia of Nations at
<http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/United-Nations-Related-Agencies/The-InternationalMonetary-Fund-IMF-ACTIVITIES.html#b>. Accessed on April 18 and 19, 2012.
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APPENDIX E: Interviewees
Soren Ambrose
Action Aid International (Kenya)
AACC Building, 2nd Floor
Waiyaki Way, Nairobi, KENYA
July 28, 2010
Fred Jonyo
Professor
University of Nairobi
Nairobi, KENYA
August 9, 2010
Musambayi Katumanga, Ph.D
University of Nairobi and National Defense College
Nairobi, KENYA
July 31, 2010
Lilian Kirimi, Ph. D
Research Fellow
Egerton University/Tegemeo Institute of Agricultural Policy and
Development
Kindaruma Lane, off Ngong Road
Nairobi, KENYA
August 10, 2010
Njoki Njoroge Njehu
Director
Daughters of Mumbi
Nairobi, Kenya
July 28, 2010
Susan W. Njoba
Kenya Investment Authority
Manager – Business Development
Kenya Railways Headquarters
Block D, 3rd Floor, Workshop Road
Off Haile Selassie Avenue
Nairobi, KENYA
July 22, 2010
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Adams Oloo, Ph.D.
Professor
University of Nairobi
Department of Political Science and
Public Administration
Nairobi, KENYA
August 9, 2010
Martin Oloo, Lawyer
Agip House, 1st Floor Entrance A
Haile Selassie Avenue
Nairobi, Kenya
July 31, 2010
Kwame Owino, Programme Officer
Institute of Economic Affairs
5th Floor, ACK Garden House, 1st. Ngong Avenue
Nairobi, KENYA
July 30, 2010
Sophie Tunu
Fusion Capital
Business Advisor
A.C.K Gardens House, Block A, Ground Floor
1st. Ngong Avenue (off Bishops Rd.)
Nairobi, KENYA
July 30, 2010
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